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In a correlated equilibrium, the players’ choice of actions is directed by random, correlated 
messages that they receive from an outside source, or mechanism. This allows for more 
equilibrium outcomes than without such messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with 
statistically independent ones (mixed-strategy equilibrium). In an incomplete information 
game, the messages may also convey information about the types of the other players, 
either because they reflect extraneous events that affect the types (correlated equilibrium) 
or because the players themselves report their types to the mechanism (communication 
equilibrium). Thus, mechanisms can be classified by the connections between the messages 
that the players receive and their own and the other players’ types, the dependence or 
independence of the messages, and whether or not randomness is involved. These 
properties may affect the achievable equilibrium outcomes, i.e., the payoffs and joint 
distributions of type and action profiles. Whereas for complete information games there are 
only three classes of equilibrium outcomes, with incomplete information the number is 14–
15 for correlated equilibria and 15–17 for communication equilibria. Each class is 
characterized by the properties of the mechanisms that implement its members. The 
majority of these classes have not been described before. JEL Classification: C72. 
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Communication equilibrium; Incomplete information; 
Bayesian games; Mechanism; Correlation device; Implementation  
1  Introduction 
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a complete information strategic game represents a 
possible outcome for rational players who do not randomize over actions. Adding the 
possibility to randomize extends the set of equilibrium outcomes by facilitating mixed-
strategy equilibria. For a correlated equilibrium, independent randomization devices are not 
sufficient – an external correlation device is required. Thus, the set of feasible equilibrium 
outcomes expands as increasingly richer mechanisms are allowed. A similar relation 
between equilibrium outcomes and mechanisms holds for incomplete information games. 
However, the relation in this case is more complex than for complete information games. 
This is because the set of equilibrium outcomes implementable by a mechanism depends on 
the extent to which its output reflects the players’ types. Implementability may depend, for 
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example, on whether the messages that the mechanism sends to the players provide them 
with information about the other players’ types, and on whether messages depend on the 
receiver’s type. The former affects the mechanism’s ability to implement type-dependent 
coordinated actions, and the latter affects its ability to transmit information selectively, that 
is, to certain types of players only.  
A mechanism may facilitate type-dependent coordinated actions if it is affected by factors 
that also affect the players’ types. For example, whether the economy is booming of 
slumping may affect both the types of firms that enter an auction and the various 
macroeconomic indicators (e.g., the CPI) that these firms factor in when deciding on their 
respective bids. By contrast, for selectivity, “knowledge” of the players’ types is not 
necessary: type-dependent perceptual abilities may suffice. For example, different 
recommendations may be issued to unilingual English and French readers simply by handing 
out a bilingual sheet with English and French texts that do not match. 
A simple, straightforward way to implement type-dependent coordinated actions is to ask 
the players to report their types. However, for this to work, the actions have to be such that 
truthful type reports are incentive compatible. This requirement defines communication 
equilibrium and distinguishes it from correlated equilibrium, which only requires the actions 
to be incentive compatible and where communication is one-way – messages from the 
mechanism to the players.  
The main objective of this paper is to chart the connections between properties of 
mechanisms and the kinds of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes 
implementable by them in incomplete information games. These connections form a rich 
and intricate structure, and they are not always obvious or perfectly intuitive. The subject 
matter is quite different – both in substance and in the relevant techniques – from issues 
studied in the context of complete information games. It has some similarity to the problem 
of implementability of social choice functions studied in mechanism-design theory, which is 
reflected by the similar terminology. However, implementability of correlated and 
communication equilibrium outcomes is not a special case of implementability of social 
choice functions (see also Kar et al., 2010).   
A second, auxiliary objective of the paper is to present a single framework that 
accommodates the majority of the previously described varieties of correlated strategies, 
correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in incomplete information games, in that 
each variety corresponds to a particular set of structural limitations on the allowed 
mechanisms. The power of these limitations stems from their effect on the mechanisms’ 
ability to orchestrate certain joint actions, make the actions incentive incompatible, or elicit 
truthful type reports.   
The paper’s plan of attack is to separate the implementability problem into three 
interrelated problems. The first problem is the implementability of correlated strategy 
distributions. Here, only the joint distribution of the players’ types and actions matters, and 
payoffs are irrelevant. The second problem, which does take payoffs and incentive 
compatibility into account, is the implementability of correlated and communication 
equilibrium distributions. The third and ultimate problem is the implementability of payoff 3 
vectors. The payoffs are uniquely determined by the joint distribution of types and actions, 
but not conversely. The advantages of this three-part approach in comparison with directly 
addressing the third problem are that it makes certain issues significantly more manageable 
and provides insights about the roots of non-implementability where it occurs.  
The presentation of the results is divided into two parts. Following the layout of the basic 
framework in Section ‎ 2, Section ‎ 3 gives an overview of the results, mainly in the form of 
Hesse diagrams that present the different classes of correlated strategy outcomes, 
correlated equilibrium outcomes and communication equilibrium outcomes and the 
connections between the various classes. Section ‎ 3 also includes several examples that 
illustrate the results and the various issues involved. The subsequent four sections give the 
details and the proofs, and Section ‎ 8 summarizes.  
1.1  Related literature 
Aumann (1987) demonstrated that correlated equilibrium can be viewed as an expression of 
Bayesian rationality. A rational player’s choice of action reflects his knowledge of the state of 
the world. The state includes a specification of the knowledge of the other players, which 
determines their actions. Bayesian rationality means that each player’s action is a best reply 
to what he knows about the others’ actions. Aumann’s paper only concerned complete 
information games; types of players and type-dependent payoffs are not part of the setting. 
However, since the state-space formulation is a standard model for Bayesian games, the 
paper pointed to the logical next step, which was to merge the two settings by allowing the 
states of the world to determine the players’ types in addition to any information that they 
posses which may be used for choosing an action. Crucially, this additional information is not 
specified by the game – it is part of the solution concept.   
Two models of this kind were proposed by Cotter (1991, 1994), which differ from one 
another in the restrictions they put on the players’ information. In a strategy correlated 
equilibrium (Cotter, 1991), the additional information takes the form of random messages 
that the players receive from an outside correlation mechanism, which is ignorant of their 
types. A correlated strategy with such a mechanism is a rule that maps the message each 
player receives to a strategy for that player, which is a prescription of a pure or randomized 
action for each of the player’s types. The equilibrium condition is that acting accordingly is 
incentive compatible in that no player can increase his expected payoff by associating 
different strategies with the messages he receives. A type correlated equilibrium (Cotter, 
1994; see also Samuelson and Zhang, 1989) can be described as a strategy correlated 
equilibrium in a version of the game in which each type of each player is an independent 
agent. This means that the mechanism sends to each player not a complete strategy but only 
the action it prescribes to the player’s actual type. The message may thus depend on the 
player’s type, unlike in a strategy correlated equilibrium, but it is still unaffected by the other 
players’ types. Consequently, the player’s action is conditionally independent of the other 
players’ types, given the player’s own type. Cotter stated that this so-called conditional 
independence property of the joint distribution of types and actions is characteristic of type 
correlated equilibria, in that any distribution with this property can be implemented by a 
mechanism as above. However, it was later shown that this assertion is incorrect 
(Milchtaich, 2004, Example 6).  4 
A different extension of correlated equilibrium to games with incomplete information is 
communication, or mediated, equilibrium (Myerson, 1994). This solution concept differs 
from those considered above in that communication is two-way. The players first send 
private messages to, and then receive such messages from, a particular mechanism, which 
thus serves as a mediator as well as a correlation device. According to the revelation 
principle (see Myerson, 1994), without loss of generality the messages sent by the players to 
the mediator may be assumed type reports. The message that each player gets from the 
mediator indicates a particular action for that player. This mechanism in required to be 
incentive compatible in that it is in each player’s best interest to report his type honestly and 
take the indicated action if all the others do the same.  
The most comprehensive account to date of correlated and communication equilibria in 
games with incomplete information is Forges’ (1993) paper, which compared strategy 
correlated equilibrium, type (or agent normal form) correlated equilibrium, communication 
equilibrium, and ‘Bayesian solution’. (A fifth solution concept considered in the paper 
concerns hierarchies of beliefs.) Bayesian solution is a very general solution concept, which 
includes strategy and type correlated equilibria as special cases. It extends an incomplete 
information game by introducing a state space in which several states may correspond to a 
single type profile. This allows players to have partial or complete information about the 
other players’ types as well as about outside events. As in Aumann’s (1987) model, the 
information structure is complemented by a mapping from states to action profiles that is 
required to satisfy the obvious incentive compatibility condition. A Bayesian solution may be 
implemented by an omniscient mediator, who knows the players’ types. In this, it differs 
from a communication equilibrium, in which the mediator totally relies on the players’ type 
reports.  
The messages that the players receive from the mediator are part of the solution concept, 
and are distinct from any signals that are part of the game itself and define the players’ 
types. The potential impact of the former (the mediator’s messages) depends on the degree 
of dependence among the latter (the players’ types). For example, with perfectly correlated 
types, the players already know each other’s type when they receive the mediator’s 
messages, which can therefore only help them coordinate their actions. Conversely, if the 
types are independent, the mediator’s messages may also inform players about the other 
players’ types. However, this may be so only if the solution concept allows the messages to 
depend on the others’ types. Therefore, depending on the solution concept, garbling, or 
randomly perturbing, in a particular way the signals that the players receive as part of the 
game may or may not change the set of equilibrium outcomes.
1 Lehrer et al. (2006) 
identified the kinds of garbling that do not affect the equilibrium outcomes for three kinds of 
correlated equilibrium in two-player Bayesian games: mixed (Nash) equilibrium, type 
correlated equilibrium, and a special kind of Bayesian solution (called belief invariant 
Bayesian solution by Forges, 2006), which satisfies a condition similar to the conditional 
independence property. They showed, for example, that garbing has no effect on mixed 
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equilibria, regardless of the payoff functions, if and only if it is performed independently for 
each player, that is, without taking into account the other player’s signal.   
Identification of information types (Milchtaich, 2004) is a special kind of garbling. It removes 
distinctions between player types that are interchangeable in terms of their effect on the 
player’s own payoff and those of the others and differ, say, only in what they knows about 
the other players’ types. Identification of information types may transform one kind of 
equilibrium into another. For example, a pure (-strategy) equilibrium (with different actions 
for different information types) may become a mixed equilibrium (with several possible 
actions for the single type that results from the identification). Thus, the collection of pure 
equilibria, for example, is not closed under identification of information types. The same is 
true for more general solution concepts. For example, this is so for type correlated 
equilibrium, since when information types are identified, the conditional independence 
property may cease to hold (Milchtaich, 2004, Examples 7). In fact, the narrowest extension 
of pure equilibrium that is closed under identification of information types is the notion of 
correlated equilibrium used in the present paper (Milchtaich, 2004, Propositions 4 and 5), 
which is similar to Forges’ (1993, 2006) Bayesian solution, or global equilibrium in the 
terminology of Lehrer et al. (2006). Thus, in this respect at least, this solution concept is not 
excessively broad.  
2  Preliminaries 
2.1  Bayesian games 
An  -player (finite) pre-Bayesian game is a function                            , where 
                    and                     are each the Cartesian product of   finite 
sets and   is the real line. The interpretation is that               is the set of players; for 
each player  , the sets    and    and the function    are respectively the type space, action 
space and payoff function of player  ; and for each type profile                      and 
action profile                     ,        is the payoff vector. A somewhat more 
general possibility is that the type of one of the players represents the state of nature, i.e., 
variables that affect the (real) players’ payoffs but are unknown to them. That player, 
Nature, does not take any action, so that his action space must be a singleton.   
A pure strategy for a player   is a function from the player’s type space to his action space, 
i.e., an element of   
  . Using some fixed indexing of the (finite) type space,         
    
    , 
any pure-strategy can be written as    
    
    , where, for each  ,   
  is the action 
prescribed to the  th type of player  . A pure-strategy profile is an assignment of a pure 
strategy to each player, i.e., an element of   
       
          
  , which can be written as 
   
    
      
    
        
    
    .  
A pre-Bayesian game becomes a (finite) Bayesian game when it is coupled with a specified 
probability measure on  , which assigns a probability to each type profile  . This measure    
gives the distribution of type profiles in the game. Its support,         , which is the 
collection of all type profiles   that have positive probability, may be a proper subset of  . 
However, it is assumed (essentially without loss of generality) that every type    of every 6 
player   is supported, in the sense that                     for some partial type profile 
                           . The measure    can always be expressed as the distribution 
of a random type profile, which is a random variable
2                  with values in   such 
that 
                            
For example, a random type profile can be constructed by restricting the measure    to its 
support and defining   as the identity map on         . It does not normally matter which 
random type profile is used to express a particular distribution of type profiles, and in this 
paper the symbol   and the definite article are used for referring to any random type profile.  
For each player  , the conditional distribution of  , given the player’s type   , is interpreted 
as the posterior beliefs of player   about the players’ types. The interpretation entails that 
each player   knows his own type    but does not necessarily know the types of the other 
players.   
2.2  Mechanisms 
A mechanism for a Bayesian game is an extraneous source of messages
3, which the players 
receive before they have to choose their actions. The messages that each player   may 
receive are elements of some finite set   , the player’s (received) message space. For each 
type profile  , the profile of messages is given by a random variable 
                             with values in the product set                    . 
Thus, a mechanism is specified by a random variable (specifically, a vector whose entries are 
indexed by the type profiles and are themselves random  -tuples)               that is 
independent of the random type profile  . The independence assumption means that, given 
the type profile, any residual randomness in the messages is extraneous to the game (see 
Section ‎ 2.2.1 for further discussion of this point). However, it does not mean that the 
messages themselves are unrelated to the type profile. To take an extreme example, if the 
mechanism is an outside observer who is capable of finding out the players’ types, the 
messages may fully convey that information:  
                        
In this example, the mechanism is purely a source of information about the other players’ 
types. Other mechanisms may serve primarily or exclusively as randomization devices, and 
convey little or no information about the types. A finer, more exact classification of 
mechanisms is facilitated by the following list of properties. Each property is expressed by a 
condition that the messages sent by the mechanism are required to satisfy for every player   
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practice such a restriction would be inconvenient.  
3 The term ‘messages’ is used here rather than ‘signals’ to emphasize the assumption that the sending 
mechanism is part of a solution concept rather than the game. ‘Signals’ in an incomplete information 
game are often synonymous with the players’ types, which are part of the game.  
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and pair of type profiles              and         
     
   . The symbol  
 
 denotes equality in 
distribution. 
( )  Player  ’s type does not affect the message he receives:  
             
        
(   )  Player  ’s type does not affect the distribution of the message he receives: 
       
 
     
        
( )  The other players’ types do not affect the message player   receives:  
                 
     
(   )  The other players’ types do not affect the distribution of the message: 
       
 
         
     
( )  The messages are non-random:  
     has a degenerate distribu on 4 
( )  The messages that different players receive are (statistically) independent:  
                    are independent. 
Conditions     and     require equality between two distributions, for specified   and   . 
Since the players’ types are actually random, this translates into equality between 
conditional distributions. Specifically,     entails that the message that player   receives is 
conditionally independent of his type   , given the other players’ types    . In property    ,    
and     are interchanged.  
Equality between distributions is a weaker requirement than equality between the random 
variables themselves, as required by properties  ,   and  .
5 The latter means that the 
random variables are equal with probability   (equivalently, pointwise equal). The 
distinction between equality in distribution and equality with probability   does not seem to 
have received sufficient attention in the existing literature on games with incomplete 
information. This paper shows that it has significant implications for correlated strategies 
and equilibria.  
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distribution of the two messages may change, for example, uncorrelated messages may become 
correlated. By contrast,   would imply that the joint distribution does not change when the other 
players’ types change. A subtler – but highly consequential – difference between   and     also applies 




2.2.1  Independence lemma and the canonical mechanism 
The definition of mechanism in effect assumes that the randomness or uncertainty regarding 
the messages that the players receive has two independent potential sources: the inherent 
randomness of the type profile, which the messages may reflect, and residual randomness, 
which persists also with a specified type profile. The following lemma shows that this 
independence assumption involves no loss of generality. Any joint distribution of types and 
messages can be produced by “mixing” the random type profile   with a random variable of 
the form               that is independent of  . The outcome of the mixture is the 
random profile of messages     , the value of which is determined by first determining the 
realization of  , which is a type profile  , and then determining the realization of     .
6   
Lemma 1. Let                     be any finite product set and   any probability 
measure on       whose marginal on   is equal to   , the distribution of type profiles. 
There exists a random variable               that is independent of the random type 
profile   such that the joint distribution of   and      is equal to  .  
Proof. For any   as above, it is possible to construct for each type profile   a random variable 
                             with values in   such that, first, for              the 
distribution of      is the probability measure on   that assigns to each element   the 
(conditional) probability   
          
       
  
second,  
for                   sa s es ( ), and in addi on, 
for every      , ( ) holds for some        with        
                
and third, 
           are independent 
and are collectively independent of  . It follows from the first and third requirements that  
                                                                    
Thus, the joint distribution of   and      is equal to  .  ∎ 
The proof of Lemma 1 details the construction of a specific mechanism               for 
any given measure   as in the lemma. This canonical mechanism
7 is such that the joint 
distribution of   and      is equal to  , and in addition, (5) and (6) hold. The latter two 
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two independent ingredients   and   are mixed to produce the actual messages to the players. 
7 The proof of the lemma allows some latitude in the construction, which means that the canonical 




special properties may seem purely technical. Property (5) concerns type profiles   that 
cannot actually occur (that is,              ), and (6) concerns relations between different 
type profiles, which by definition cannot coexist (since only one type profile is realized). 
However, property (6) is quite potent in that it essentially prevents the mechanism from 
satisfying   or  , unless it also satisfies  . This is because two random variables that are 
equal and independent necessarily have degenerate distributions. Mainly because of this 
limitation, it is not possible to restrict attention to canonical mechanisms. They are, 
however, quite useful technical constructs. 
2.3  Correlated strategies 
With a specified mechanism, a correlated strategy                  in an  -player 
Bayesian game specifies the action    that each player   takes as a function                 
of the player’s type    and the message he receives   . Thus,               .
8 As indicated, 
the messages are part of the specification of the correlated strategy rather than the game. 
Their (potential) randomness and that of the types means that the actions are also random. 
The random action profile corresponding to a correlated strategy   with a mechanism 
              is the random variable                  defined by 
                          
Correlated strategies include several other kinds of strategies as special cases. If the 
message that each player receives is unaffected by the player’s own type or the other 
players’ types and is also non-random, i.e., if the mechanism satisfies  ,   and   (which 
effectively means that the player does not receive any messages at all), then, for some fixed 
          , 
                       
In this case, for each player  ,    associates a (deterministic) action    with each type   , 
which means that the correlated strategy is effectively a pure-strategy profile, and may be 
referred to as such. A more general case is that of a mixed-strategy profile, which is defined 
as a correlated strategy with a mechanism that satisfies  ,   and  . These properties of the 
mechanism mean that the messages are independent and equal to                  
      , where    is any fixed type profile, and the random action profile satisfies  
                                                   
This is effectively the same as (and it can be implemented by) private randomization over 
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This assumption involves no loss of generality, and in particular, it does not exclude mixed strategies. 
It just means that even private randomizations are viewed as parts of a single large device, which may 
or may not be a physical entity. As an example of the former possibility, randomization may be 
relegated to the device from which the players receive messages. In this case, a player-specific 
random number is appended to each message, such that these   random numbers are independent. 
Clearly, a device modified in this way does not generally satisfy  , but the modification has no effect 
on properties             or  . 
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pure strategies independently for each player.
9 An even more general case is that of a 
random (pure-strategy) profile, which is defined as a correlated strategy with a mechanism 
that satisfies   and  . The actions can still be presented as in (8), but since property   is not 
assumed, the randomization cannot generally be emulated by independent private 
randomizations. 
For a specified correlated strategy   with a mechanism  , the joint distribution of the 
random type profile   and the actions   (the latter given by (7)) is called the correlated 
strategy distribution (CSD). It is of course possible for several pairs of strategies and 
mechanisms to have the same CSD. A CSD is said to be implementable by a particular 
mechanism (which implements the distribution) if there is some correlated strategy with 
that mechanism that gives the distribution. A CSD is a pure-strategy distribution, mixed-
strategy distribution or random-profile distribution if it is implementable by some 
mechanism   with properties  ,   and  , properties  ,   and  , or properties   and  , 
respectively. 
Every CSD   is a probability measure on       whose marginal on   is   .
10 Hence, it has a 
canonical mechanism               (see Section ‎ 2.2.1), in which the message space    of 
each player   is his action space   . The interpretation is that the canonical mechanism 
explicitly tells each player which action to take. The canonical strategy   with this 
mechanism simply instructs the players to obey, that is, it is defined by  
                       
The corresponding random action profile is the canonical random action profile, which is 
given by 
                                                   
This equality proves that the canonical mechanism   of the CSD   implements  . Obviously, 
a similar equality holds for the canonical mechanism and strategy of every probability 
measure on       with the marginal   . Therefore, every such measure is a CSD. This 
establishes the following.  
Lemma 2. In a Bayesian game, a necessary and sufficient condition for a probability measure 
on       to be a correlated strategy distribution is that the marginal on   is equal to the 
distribution of type profiles. 
2.4  Correlated equilibria 
The players’ incentives in a Bayesian game are embodied by their payoff functions, 
          . For a correlated strategy   with a mechanism  , the payoff of each player   is 
                                                            
9 A mixed-strategy profile may also be viewed as a behavior strategy for each player, that is, a 
randomized action for each of the player’s types. 
10 Since the distribution of type profiles is given as part of the specification of the game, a CSD may 
also be viewed as an assignment of a probability measure on   to every type profile  , namely, the 
distribution of the players’ action when they have types   (which is arbitrarily if   lies outside the 
support of   ). 
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the random variable        , where   is the random type profile and   is the random action 
profile given by (7). The correlated strategy is incentive compatible if none of the players   
can increase his expected payoff by a unilateral deviation, that is, by changing the function 
determining his action from    to some other function   
              . Equivalently, 
incentive compatibility means that the action that the correlated strategy specifies for each 
player always maximizes the conditional expectation
11 of the player’s payoff, given his type 
and the message he receives. The latter condition is used in the following definition.  
Definition 1. In a Bayesian game, a correlated strategy   with a mechanism   is a correlated 
equilibrium if the corresponding random action profile   is such that, for every player   and 
action   
  for that player, 
                    
                       
If a correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium, then the correlated strategy distribution 
is said to be a correlated equilibrium distribution (CED). A CED is implementable by a 
particular mechanism if there is some correlated equilibrium with that mechanism that gives 
the distribution. A CED is a pure- or mixed-equilibrium distribution if it is implementable by 
some mechanism with properties  ,   and  , or properties  ,   and  , respectively. Two 
additional kinds of CEDs are defined in Section ‎ 3.2.3.  
An equivalent definition of CED, which does not explicitly refer to an implementing 
mechanism, is given by the following lemma. The lemma is formulated in terms of random 
variables (whose joint distribution is the CED) rather than in purely measure theoretic terms. 
This is not absolutely necessary, but it makes the formulation somewhat more transparent 
and intuitive, and closer in appearance to Definition 1. 
Lemma 3. In a Bayesian game, a necessarily and sufficient condition for a correlated strategy 
distribution   to be a correlated equilibrium distribution is that some (equivalently, every
12) 
pair of random variables                  and                  whose joint distribution 
is   satisfies  
                    
                            
        
Proof. Let   be the canonical mechanism for  . The canonical correlated strategy   with 
this mechanism is a correlated equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the condition in Definition 
1.  Since the corresponding random action profile   is the canonical one, i.e.,     , that 
condition is equivalent to (11). This proves the sufficiency of the condition in the lemma, and 
it remains to prove its necessity. 
                                                            
11 For a random variable   and a real-valued random variable  , which are defined on the same 
probability space, the conditional expectation        is also a random variable on that space. It is 
constant on every event of the form         (where   takes a particular value  ), and its value there 
is           , the conditional expectation of  , given that      . The meaning of equalities and 
inequalities involving conditional expectations is that they hold with probability   (equivalently, hold 
pointwise). 
12 The equivalence holds since whether inequality (11) below holds only depends on the joint 
distribution of   and  . 
(10) 
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Every CED is by definition the joint distribution of a pair of random variables   and   such 
that the latter is the random action profile corresponding to some correlated equilibrium   
with a mechanism   that satisfies the condition in Definition 1. For every player  , taking the 
condition expectation of both sides of (10), given    and   , gives 
                      
                              
Since, by (7),    can be expressed as a function of    and      , the iterated conditional 
expectation in (12) is equal to the (single) conditional expectation in (11) (see Shiryaev, 
1996, Chapter I, §8). This proves that the condition in the lemma is also necessary for CED. ∎ 
A useful immediate corollary of Lemma 3 (which is already established in the first part of the 
proof) is that, to check whether a given CSD is a CED, it suffices to consider its canonical 
mechanism and strategy.  
Corollary 1. A correlated strategy distribution is a correlated equilibrium distribution if and 
only if the canonical strategy, with the canonical mechanism, is a correlated equilibrium.  
A probability measure   on       that satisfies the condition in Lemma 3 is sometimes 
referred to itself as a correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2007). Another 
reasonable alternative definition of this concept would be a mechanism with which the 
canonical strategy is a correlated equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1. Lemma 3 and 
Corollary 1 show that these two alternatives are not fundamentally different from the 
definition of correlated equilibrium given above. However, this paper emphatically 
distinguishes between correlated equilibrium and correlated equilibrium distribution, and 
between correlated equilibrium and the mechanism it uses. These distinctions are 
instrumental for the paper’s primary objective of studying the implementability relation 
between a correlated equilibrium distribution and a mechanism, that is, the existence of 
some correlated equilibrium with the latter that gives the former.  
2.5  Communication equilibria 
Communication equilibrium differs from correlated equilibrium in that the players self-
report their types to the mechanism. Correspondingly, the incentive-compatibility condition 
of correlated equilibrium is augmented by the requirement that a player cannot gain from 
being the only one to lie about his type (and, possibly, deviate from the correlated strategy). 
The reliance on the players’ reports turns the mechanism from a primary source of 
information about the (other) players’ types to a secondary source – a mediator. The 
mediator may be a physical entity, such as a disinterested third party or a piece of hardware, 
or it may be a communication protocol, such as a one-shot direct exchange of messages 
between two players.
13 Effectively, the message exchange in the last example is not limited 
to type reports. This is because each player could in principle use a gadget that takes a type 
                                                            
13 The question of how, and to what extent, can unmediated communication between players replace 
a mediator or a correlation device lies outside to scope of this paper. This question has been 
extensively studied, for both complete and incomplete information games. See, for example, Forges 
(1990), Ben-Porath (2003), Gerardi (2004) and references therein.  
(12) 13 
as input and outputs the required message. The players’ individual gadgets could then be 
viewed collectively as a single mechanism, in the sense of the definition in Section ‎ 2.2.  
When a correlated strategy                  with a mechanism   is used, a player   has 
an incentive to lie about his type if he can increase his expected payoff by misreporting it as 
some type   
 , thereby changing the (random) messages sent to the players to from     , 
where              is the true type profile, to     
      . Player   may be able to take 
advantage of the resulting change of the other players’ actions by altering the rule that 
determines his response to the messages the mechanism sends him, from    to some 
  
              . The resulting random action profile         
    
       
    is given by  
  
      
          
           
                
                      
Communication equilibrium is defined by the requirement that, regardless of player  ’s true 
type, misreporting it in the above manner cannot increase the player’s expected payoff.  
Definition 2. In a Bayesian game, a correlated strategy   with a mechanism   is a 
communication equilibrium if, for every player  , type   
  for that player and function 
  
              , 
                              
where   and    are given by (7) and (13). 
An extension of the revelation-principle argument used in the first paragraph of this 
subsection shows that the set of possible communication equilibrium outcomes would not 
change if players were allowed to send to the mechanism arbitrary (rather than just type) 
reports, possibly determined by private randomization. For a player   of type   , such a 
report would be described by a random variable        with values in some finite (say) set 
    Processing the reports would require a “generalized” mechanism, which assigns to each 
possible profile of reports                                     a random profile of 
messages     , which are sent back to the players. The action    for each player   would 
then be determined as a function      by the player’s type   , the report    he sent to the 
mechanism and the message    he got in response:  
                     
The reason this setup is in fact no more general than the one described above is that there is 
a correlated strategy   with a “normal” mechanism that produces identical actions. 
Essentially, the mechanism internalizes the players’ reporting process. For each type profile 
 , the random message that the mechanism sends to each player   is the pair 
                                     
The correlated strategy   then determines  ’s action as a function of his type    and the 
message         he received according to  
                                 
It is a simple, and standard, exercise to show that if with the generalized mechanism none of 
the players   can increase his expected payoff by changing               (which specifies the 
(13) 14 
report player   sends) and/or      (which specifies his response to the mechanism’s messages), 
then the correlated strategy   with the “normal” mechanism described above is a 
communication equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.  
A similar argument, which is also part of the revelation principle, shows that, in every 
Bayesian game, the set of communication equilibrium outcomes would not change also if 
the messages that the mechanism sends to the players were required to be concrete action 
recommendations rather than arbitrary objects (see Myerson, 1994). If a correlated strategy 
distribution is a communication equilibrium distribution (MED), that is, if it is the CSD of 
some communication equilibrium, then there is some mechanism in which the message 
spaces coincide with the respective players’ actions spaces, and with which the canonical 
strategy of obeying the received message is a communication equilibrium that gives the 
MED. However, this does not mean that attention can be restricted to communication 
equilibria of this kind.  As for correlated equilibria, such a restriction would be inconsistent 
with the goals of this paper, since it might affect in an unwarranted way the properties of 
the implementing mechanisms. For example, suppose that two players base their choice of 
actions on their own type and the type report that they receive from the other player. To 
implement this, it suffices to use a mechanism with property  , which simply transmits the 
reports. However, the same would not be true if the mechanism were also required to 
indicate each player’s actual action. Since the actions depend on the players’ own types, it 
would be impossible to maintain property  . More generally, the properties of the 
mechanism should only describe the properties of the communication channels available to 
the players (which may or may not involve a mediator). The way the players use these 
channels is expressed by a different entity, which is their correlated strategy.  
3  Overview of Results 
This section summarizes the main results in this paper and illustrates them by examples. The 
results are described in greater depth and detail in Sections ‎ 4, ‎ 5, ‎ 6 and ‎ 7. 
3.1  Attributes of correlated strategy distributions 
The six properties of mechanisms described in Section ‎ 2.2 are not independent. Property   
implies    ,   implies    , and   implies  . Therefore, for each of the three pairs, a mechanism 
may satisfy both properties, only the second one, or none of them. Altogether, there are 
(    )    possibilities. This classification of mechanisms induces a classification of 
correlated strategy distributions. Each CSD has or does not have the attribute that it can be 
implemented by a mechanism with a particular property, or more generally a set of 
properties  . For example, a CSD is  -implementable if it is implementable by some 
mechanism with property  , and it is  , -implementable
14 if it is implementable by some 
mechanism that has both property   and property  . The various attributes of CSDs are not 
independent. For example,  , -implementability implies    , -implementability, since   is a 
more stringent requirement than    , and it is implied by  ,   -implementability, which 
involves the additional requirement that the implementing mechanism also satisfies  . A 
                                                            
14 Since it is the set of properties that matters, and not their order,   ,  -implementability might be a 
better notation. However, for the sake of readability, the curly brackets are omitted.    15 
natural question, for each of these implications, is whether the reverse implication also 
holds, so that the two attributes are actually equivalent. As the Hesse diagram in Figure 1 
shows, the answer is affirmative for  , - and    , -implementability (which are equivalent) 
but negative for  , - and  ,   -implementability (which are not equivalent). Thus, every 
CSD that is implementable by some mechanism that satisfies     and   is also implementable 
by a mechanism that satisfies   and   (and vice versa), and there is some such CSD in some 
Bayesian game that is not implementable by any mechanism that also satisfies  .  
As Figure 1 shows, there are not 27 but only 7 distinct (i.e., nonequivalent) attributes of 
CSDs that can be defined in terms of the properties of the implementing mechanisms. Each 
can be described in several equivalent ways by using different combinations of properties. 
For example,  -implementability and    -implentability are both equivalent to the attribute of 
simply being a CSD, which is denoted in Figure 1 by the empty set (of properties of 
implementing mechanisms)    . Thus, the limitations that these two properties put on the 
implementing mechanisms are inconsequential. Note that the seven attributes of CSDs are 
not all comparable. That is, some attributes do not imply and are not implied by certain 
other attributes. 
Additional attributes of correlated strategy distributions in Bayesian games may conceivably 
be defined by conjunction. For example, a CSD may be both    -implementable and  -
implementable. A natural question is whether this is equivalent to      -implementability. 
More generally, if there is some implementing mechanism with a particular set of properties 
and another mechanism with some other properties, does it follow that the CSD is 
implementable by a single mechanism that has all the properties of the other two? Lemma 5 
in Section ‎ 4 answers this question in the affirmative. An immediate corollary of this result 
(see Section ‎ 3.4) is that conjunctions do not in fact define new attributes of CSDs. 
3.1.1  Intrinsic characterizations 
Each of the seven attributes of CSDs in Figure 1 can also be characterized intrinsically, that is, 
without explicitly referring to implementing mechanisms. The significance of intrinsic 
characterizations is that they may make it easier to check whether a particular distribution 
has a particular attribute. Lemma 2 may be viewed as an intrinsic characterization of the 
weakest attribute, which is simply being a CSD (I in Figure 1). The following proposition 
characterizes the strongest attribute, which is being a pure-strategy distribution (VII in 
Figure 1), as well as the attribute of being a mixed-strategy distribution (V in Figure 1).  
Proposition 1. A correlated strategy distribution in a Bayesian game is a mixed-strategy 
distribution if and only if it is the joint distribution of a pair of random variables    
             and                  such that  
(i)  For each player  ,    and           are conditionally independent, given   . 
A correlated strategy distribution is a pure-strategy distribution if and only if it satisfies the 
stronger condition in which (i) is replaced by 
(ii)  For each player  , the conditional distribution of  ’s action   , given his type   , is 
degenerate. 16 
 
Figure 1. Hesse diagram of the different attributes of correlated strategy distributions (CSDs) in Bayesian 
games, ordered by implication. An attribute is represented by a box containing its equivalent definitions, each 
of which is a set of properties possessed by some mechanism that implements the CSD. Two sets in the same 
box identify mechanisms that implement exactly the same CSDs. For those in different boxes, the 
implementable CSDs are different. A line segment connecting two boxes indicates that the lower attribute 
implies the upper one but the reverse implication does not hold. 
In other words, pure-strategy distributions are characterized by the property that if a 
player’s type is known, there is no uncertainty about his action. Mixed-strategy distributions 
are characterized by the property that if a player’s type is known, his action does not add 
any information about the other players’ types or actions.
15 Proposition 1 is proved in 
Section ‎ 4. 
The next proposition characterizes random-profile distributions (III in Figure 1). The 
characterizing property is the existence of a probability measure   on   
       
          
   
that satisfies a certain condition. Such a measure assigns a probability to each pure-strategy 
profile    
    
      
    
        
    
     (see Section ‎ 2.1). For each type profile 
                 there is a corresponding marginal measure    on                , 
which assigns to each action profile                  the probability that the actions 
                                                            
15 For an extension of this result to games with a random number of players, see Milchtaich (2004, 
Theorem 2). 
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associated with the players’ types specified by   are those specified by  . Formally, 
       
        
    
      
    
        
    
         
       
          
       
     
       
           
The proof of the following proposition is given in Section ‎ 4, and it is illustrated by Example 1 
below.  
Proposition 2. A correlated strategy distribution   is a random-profile distribution if and only 
if there is a probability measure   on   
       
          
   such that   
                                             
where    is the distribution of type profiles and    is the marginal measure defined by (14).  
A random-profile distribution is not necessarily a mixed-strategy distribution. Therefore, by 
Proposition 1, it may not have the property that if a player’s type is known, his action does 
not add any information about the other players’ types or actions. However, a random-
profile distribution always has the weaker property that, if a player’s type is known, his 
action does not add any information about the other players’ types (but may say something 
about their actions). This property can be expressed formally as follows (Forges, 1993). 
Definition 3. A correlated strategy distribution   has the conditional independence property 
if for some (equivalently, every) pair of random variables   and   whose joint distribution is 
 , the action    of each player   and the types     of the other players are conditionally 
independent, given  ’s own type   . 
The conditional independence property is not, however, unique to random-profile 
distributions. As shown by the following example (which is based on Example 6 in 
Milchtaich, 2004; see also Lehrer at al., 2010, and Forges, 2006), even for two-player games 
the two conditions are not equivalent.
16 Whereas being a random-profile distribution (which 
by definition means    -implementability) is equivalent to  -implementability, it is shown 
by Proposition 3 in Section ‎ 4 that the conditional independence property is equivalent to the 
weaker attribute of    -implementability (equivalently,      -implementability; II in Figure 1). 
Example 1. A correlated strategy distribution with the conditional independence property 
that is not a random-profile distribution. The two players in a       Bayesian game have 
identical action spaces,                , and identical two-element type spaces, 
                 . The four type profiles are equally probable, so that types are 
independent. (Independence is not a crucial assumption. It would suffice to assume that all 
type profiles have positive probability.) A correlated strategy distribution is defined as 
follows: (i) If both players have type   , the action profile is either       or      , each 
                                                            
16 Forges (1993) and Cotter’s (199 ) suggestion that the two properties are equivalent is mistaken. 
The mistake was corrected in Forges (2006). As explained below, the non-equivalence reflects the 
difference between properties   and     of devices. 
(14) 18 
with probability    , and (ii) if the type profile is any of the other three, the action profile is 
either       or      , each with probability    .  
This correlated strategy distribution has the conditional independence property, since for 
each type profile, each player takes action   with probability    . However, this is not a 
random-profile distribution. This can be proved by assuming that a measure   on pure-
strategy profiles as in Proposition 2 exists, and showing that this assumption leads to a 
contradiction. Since, by (ii), there is zero probability that the players take identical actions 
when the type profile is different from        ,   must, in particular, assign zero 
probability of any pure-strategy profile of the form          ,           or          , where 
a wildcard action   can be either   or  . The same must therefore be true for any pure-
strategy profile of the form          , which necessarily also has one of the above three 
forms. However, this implies that there is zero probability that both players play   when the 
type profile is        , which contradicts (i). 
Intrinsic characterizations for the remaining two attributes of CSDs (IV and VI in Figure 1) are 
given by Proposition 4 in Section ‎ 4. 
3.2  Attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions 
A correlated equilibrium distribution in a Bayesian game is also a correlated strategy 
distribution but the converse is not always true. However, since every correlated strategy 
distribution can be made a correlated equilibrium distribution simply by replacing the payoff 
functions by constant ones, the number of distinct (i.e., nonequivalent) attributes of CEDs 
that can be defined in terms of the properties of the implementing mechanisms is not 
smaller than for CSDs. In fact, as Figure 2 shows, the number is significantly larger: 14 or 15 
instead of 7. This reflects the fact that the classifications of CEDs can be viewed as consisting 
of two layers: (i) the classification induced by the different attributes of CSDs, and (ii) the 
refinement that results from also taking into account the incentive compatibility 
requirement (expressed by Lemma 3). Thus, two CEDs in a Bayesian game may differ (i) in 
that even as CSDs they require different kinds of implementing mechanisms, or (ii) only in 
that different kinds of implementing mechanisms are compatible with the equilibrium 
condition. This is a useful distinction, which seems to be lacking in the existing literature on 
games with incomplete information. 
Where the equilibrium condition is effective is the connection between a player’s type and 
the messages he receives, i.e., properties   and     of the mechanism. For CSDs these 
properties do not make any difference, as can be seen in Figure 1, but this is not so for CEDs. 
For example, as can be seen in Figure 2, for CEDs the three attributes of simply being a CED, 
 -implementability and    -implementability (I, Ia and Ib in Figure 2) are not equivalent. Thus, 
there are CEDs in some Bayesian games that cannot be implemented by any mechanism 
satisfying    , and there are CEDs that are implementable by such a mechanism but cannot be 
implemented by any mechanism with the stronger property  . The following two examples 
present such CEDs. Note that these examples, like the other ones in this subsection and 
Example 1, concern two-player games. Therefore, the Hesse diagrams in Figure 1 (CSDs) and 
Figure 2 (CEDs) apply to two-player Bayesian games as well as to the general,  -player case. 19 
 
Figure 2. Hesse diagram of the different attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions (CEDs) in Bayesian 
games, ordered by implication. As in Figure 1, each attribute is represented by a box, and an implication 
relation is represented by a line. A conjunction symbol   means that the CED is implementable both by a 
mechanism with one property and by a mechanism satisfying the other property. The line marked ? represents 
an uncertain relation: it is not known whether the reverse implication also holds (in which case the two 
connected boxes should be coalesced).  
Example 2. A correlated equilibrium distribution that is not    -implementable. In a symmetric 
      game with the game structure and distribution of type profiles described in Example 1, 
the two players always get equal payoffs, which for a type profile         are given by the 
payoff matrix 
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Thus, depending on the type profile,   or   is a dominant action for both players. The 
message that each player receives is a type profile. For both types of player 1 and for type 
   of player 2, this type profile is the real one        . However, for type    of player 2, the 
message is always        . With this mechanism, the correlated strategy that instructs 
each player to choose the dominant action for the type profile specified by the message he 
receives is a correlated equilibrium. Types    and    of player 1 and type    of player 2 
clearly cannot do any better than playing according to the strategy, which gives them the 
expected payoffs  ,     and    , respectively. The same is true for type    of player 2, 
whose expected payoff would decrease from   to     if he switched from his (constant) 
action   to  .  
The mechanism described above does not involve randomization, and thus has property  , 
but it does not satisfy    . In fact, the corresponding correlated equilibrium distribution is not 
implementable by any mechanism with the latter property. Specifically, it is not 
implementable by any mechanism for which, for each type of player 1, the message that 
player 2 receives is (statistically) independent of his own type. To see this, suppose that such 
a mechanism exists, and let   
  and   
  be some specific messages that player 2 receives 
with positive probability (which is the same for both types of that player) when player 1’s 
type is    and   , respectively. The two messages cannot be identical, for otherwise type 
   of player 2 would receive this message with positive probability both when 1’s type is    
and when the type if   , which is inconsistent with the fact that (according to the above 
distribution) with probability   he plays   in the former case and   in the latter. Therefore, 
every such   
  and   
  must be distinct, which implies that player 2 can always tell by his 
message the type, and hence also the action, of his opponent. However, this is inconsistent 
with incentive compatibility, since it implies that, by choosing the same action as the 
opponent, type    of player 2 could increase his payoff from   to    . This contradiction 
proves that the above correlated equilibrium distribution is not implementable by any 
mechanism satisfying    . 
Example 3. A correlated equilibrium distribution that is    - but not  -implementable. The 
game is the same as in Example 2. A correlated equilibrium distribution in this game is given 
by Table 1, which specifies the (conditional) distribution of the players’ action profile for 
each type profile. As seen in the table, the marginal distributions, i.e., the probability that a 
player of a given type plays   or  , depend only on the opponent’s type. (Specifically,   has 
probability 0.75 or 0.5 if the type of the opponent is    or   , respectively.) Therefore, a 
mechanism that randomly chooses an action profile         according to the probabilities 
corresponding to the players’ actual type profile and reports    to player 1 and    to 
player 2 has property    . The correlated strategy of acting according to the messages is a 
correlated equilibrium; it is not difficult to check that a player can never increase his 
expected payoff by deviating to the other action. It is also true, but less easy to check, that 
the CED in Table 1 is not implementable by any mechanism that has the stronger property  . 
In fact, it takes a computer to check this. Although the problem is a standard linear 
programming one – it needs to be checked that a particular system of linear equalities and 
inequalities does not have a solution – the number of variables and equalities/inequalities 
involved (at least 256 and 20, respectively) is far too great for manual calculations.   21 
  Player 2 
      Type         Type      
Player 1 
                     
Type        0.75  0  0.75     0.25  0.25  0.5 
   0  0.25  0.25     0.5  0  0.5 
    0.75  0.25      0.75  0.25   
                     
Type        0.25  0.5  0.75     0  0. 5  0.5 
   0.25  0  0.25     0.5  0  0.5 
    0.5  0.5      0.5  0.5   
Table 1. A correlated equilibrium distribution for Example 3. The four type profiles are equally probable. For 
each of them, the joint distribution of player 1’s and player 2’s actions (which can be   or  ), as well as the 
marginal distributions, are given.  
Some intuition
17 about why a mechanism with property   cannot implement the CED in 
Table 1 can be gained by considering two conceivable mechanisms with this property. The 
first mechanism generates the messages by randomizing over pure-strategy profiles 
according to a suitable distribution and then recommending to each player the action that 
his pure strategy specifies for the opponent’s actual type. In this way, a player’s own type 
does not affect the message he receives. This mechanism fails on a very basic level: it cannot 
implement the distribution in Table 1 even as a correlated strategy distribution. The problem 
is similar to that in Example 1, and it does not involve incentives (i.e., payoffs).  
The second conceivable mechanism for the CED in Table 1 has property   by virtue of 
sending as a message to each player not a single action but a pure strategy, and leaving it to 
the player to choose the action corresponding to his actual type. (Such a mechanism is used 
in the proof of Proposition 5 below.) Specifically, the mechanism first chooses action profiles 
according to the probabilities specified in Table 1, independently for each of the four type 
profiles. Then, based on the players’ actual type profile        , it tells player 1 both his 
action for the type profile         and his action for        , and similarly for player 2. If 
the players use the messages in the intended manner, i.e., take the first or second action if 
their type is    or   , respectively, then the action distributions for the four type profiles 
are indeed as in Table 1. However, this correlated strategy is not a correlated equilibrium. 
The reason is that the double message conveys too much information about the opponent’s 
type. By assumption, the prior probability that player 2 has type    is    . By Bayes’ rule, 
the posterior probability that 2 has that type given that player 1 plays   is    . Thus, telling 
player 1 which action he should take gives him some information about  ’s type, but not too 
much information, in that taking the action is still optimal for him. (As indicated in the 
previous paragraph, telling the players only the actions they should take cannot be 
implemented by a mechanism that satisfies  .) A double message as above amounts to two 
independent draws from the same unknown distribution, which are more informative about 
the underlying distribution than a single draw. For example, telling player 1 that he should 
play   whether his type is    or    increases the (posterior) probability that  ’s type is    
to almost 0.7. This probability is greater than 2/3, which implies that, regardless of the 
actions the two types of play 2 take,   is the better action for type    of player 1. Thus, a 
player may deduce from the additional information conveyed by the double message that 
                                                            
17 Note that this is not meant to be an outline of a proof.  22 
his expected payoff from taking the action he is supposed to take is actually less than for the 
alternative action.   
Examples 2 and 3 illustrate a point of general significance. The reason   and     affect 
implementability of CEDs is that these properties may entail inability to restrict messages to 
certain types of players only. This is not a problem for correlated strategies, where 
information cannot do any harm, but it may be a problem for correlated equilibria, where 
incentive compatibility matters. However, as can be seen in Figure 2, whether this is actually 
so depends on the other properties of the mechanism. For example, for    -implementable 
CEDs (II in Figure 2), requiring that the implementing mechanism also satisfy   or     does not 
make any difference.  
3.2.1  Attributes inherited from correlated strategy distributions 
Since a correlated equilibrium distribution in a Bayesian game is in particular a correlated 
strategy distribution, it has as such one or more of the attributes in Figure 1. However, a CED 
that as a CSD has the attribute that it is implementable by a mechanism with a particular set 
of properties is not necessarily implementable by such a mechanism as a CED. That is, it may 
be impossible to find a suitable correlated strategy with that kind of mechanism that is also 
a correlated equilibrium. For example, the CED in Example 2 is not    -implementable even 
though it is    -implementable as a CSD (since this is so for every CSD; see Figure 1). However, 
as the following theorem shows, this kind of discrepancy between the two notions of 
implementability only arises when properties   or     of mechanisms are involved. Since the 
other four properties of mechanisms defined in Section ‎ 2.2 are sufficient to characterize all 
the attributes of CSDs in Figure 1, this means that a CED has attribute I, II, III, IV, V, VI or VII 
in Figure 2 if and only if, as a CSD, it has the similarly numbered attribute in Figure 1. Thus, 
for example, a CED is a pure- or mixed-equilibrium distribution if and only if is a pure- or 
mixed-strategy distribution, respectively. The proof of the theorem is given in Section ‎ 5. 
Theorem 1. For                , a correlated equilibrium distribution is implementable by a 
mechanism with all the properties in   if and only if it satisfies a similar condition as a 
correlated strategy distribution. 
It follows from Theorem 1 that the intrinsic characterizations for the seven attributes of 
CSDs given in Section ‎ 3.1.1 and (Propositions 3 and 4 in) Section ‎ 4 also apply to the 
corresponding attributes of CEDs. For example, a CED is    -implementable (attribute II in 
Figure 2) if and only if it has the conditional independence property. An intrinsic 
characterization for the very attribute of being a CED (I in Figure 2) is given by Lemma 3, 
which says that a CSD is a CED if and only if it satisfies a certain incentive-compatibility 
condition (for distributions). It follows that, for example, an    -implementable CED can be 
(intrinsically) characterized as a CSD that satisfies the incentive-compatibility condition and 
has the conditional independence property.  
3.2.2  Attributes defined by conjunction 
A significant difference between attributes of CSDs and those of CEDs concerns the effect of 
conjunctions. As indicated in Section ‎ 3.1, if a CSD that is implementable by a mechanism 
with one of the properties in Section ‎ 2.2 is also implementable by a mechanism with 23 
another property, then it is implementable by a single mechanism that has both properties. 
It follows from Theorem 1 that this remains true for CEDs as long as the properties 
concerned are not   or    . However, as the following two examples show, this is not so in 
general. The first example presents a CED that is implementable by a mechanism with 
property   and by a mechanism with property   but is not implementable by any 
mechanism with both properties. The second example replaces   with  . 
Example 4. A correlated equilibrium distribution that is  - and as well as  -implementable 
but not    -implementable. In a two-player Bayesian game, player 1 has two types,   
  and 
  
 , and two actions,   and  . Player 2 has three types,   
 ,   
  and   
 , and only one action,  . 
All type profiles except    
    
   may occur, and they have the same probability (   ). If 
player 1 plays  , the payoff to both players is    . If he plays  , the payoff vector is 
determined by the type profile according to the following table: 
    
          






               
                 
 
The lowest possible expected payoff for player 2 in this game is    . As shown below, there 
is a unique correlated equilibrium distribution with this payoff, and this CED is both  -
implementable and    -implementable but it is not even      -implementable.  
For player  ’s expected payoff to be    , player 1 should play   if and only if the type profile 
is    
    
  . Consider the implementing mechanism with property   (i.e., no randomization) 
that sends to player 1 the message   if the type profile is    
    
   and otherwise sends  . 
The correlated strategy in which player 1 follows the mechanism’s instructions is a 
correlated equilibrium, since it always gives maximum payoff to type   
  of player 1 and gives 
  
  (who is always instructed to play  ( an expected payoff of  , which is greater than the     
he would receive from playing  . Another mechanism, with properties   and  , that 
implements the same CED is a mechanism that sends to player 1 the message   or   if 
player 2 has type   
  or   
  respectively, and sends either message with probability     if the 
type is   
 . The correlated strategy in which player 1 follows the mechanism’s instructions if 
his type is   
  but always plays   if the type is   
  is a correlated equilibrium, with the same 
CED. This is because the message that type   
  of player 1 receives does not affect the 
probability that he assigns to player  ’s type being   
 , which is     regardless of the 
received message.  
It remains to show that any mechanism with properties     and   cannot implement the 
above CED. The message that player 1 receives from a mechanism with these properties 
must be a function of player  ’s type, say   
 ,   
  or   
  if the type is   
 ,   
  and   
 , 
respectively. To implement the CED, in which the action that type   
  of player 1 takes 
depends on whether or not  ’s type is   
 , the message   
  must be different from   
 . 
Therefore, one of these, say   
 , must also be different from   
 . But this means that the 
mechanism effectively tells player 1 when  ’s type is   
 . Therefore, in any correlated 
equilibrium with that mechanism, player 1 plays (his payoff-maximizing action)  , and not  , 
when the type profile is    
    
  .  24 
  Player 2 
      Type         Type      
Player 1 
                     
Type        2  0  2/3     0  0  2/3 
   0  1  1/3     1  0  1/3 
    1/2  1/2      1/2  1/2   
                     
Type        0  0  1/3     0  0  1/2 
   0  0  2/3     0  0  1/2 
    1/2  1/2      1/2  1/2   
Table 2. A correlated equilibrium distribution for Example 5. The four type profiles are equally probable. For 
each of them, the actions that players 1 and 2 take are independent. The probabilities that these actions are   
or   are given at the margins of the corresponding box. The numbers inside the box are player 1’s payoffs. 
Player 2 always gets payoff  .  
Example 5. A correlated equilibrium distribution that is  - as well as  -implementable but not 
   -implementable. The game structure and distribution of type profiles are again as in 
Examples 1, 2 and 3. The payoff matrices of player 1, one for each type profile, are shown in 
Table 2. Player 2 has the constant payoff function  . A mechanism with property   randomly 
chooses an action for each player for each type profile according to the probabilities shown 
in Table 2, such that these eight choices are independent. It then tells each player the action 
chosen for him for the actual type profile. The players’ strategy is to play accordingly. This is 
a correlated equilibrium. The reason is that a change of action by player 1 may affect his 
payoff only if his type is    and (i) player 2 has type    and he plays  , (ii) player 2 has type 
   and he plays  , or (iii) player 2 has type    and he plays  . The effect in case (i) has the 
opposite sign and twice the magnitude of the effect in the other two cases. Since (i), (ii) and 
(iii) always has equal conditional probabilities, given that the type of player 1 is    and given 
his action, this means that the conditional expectation of the gain from changing action is 
always zero. 
The same CED is implementable by a mechanism with property  . The mechanism first 
chooses two pairs of actions,                and               . The pairs are chosen 
independently of one another, the probability that    equals      ,      ,       or       
is    ,    ,     and    , respectively, and for    the corresponding probabilities are    , 
   ,     and    . Then, for each type profile            , the mechanism chooses an action 
  
  for player 2, with probabilities (for   and  ) that depend on (both   and)    (that was 
chosen in the first stage). Specifically, the probability that   
      is     unless             
and (i)           , in which case the probability is    , or (ii)           , in which case the 
probability is    . Finally, the mechanism sends messages to the players, which depend on 
the choices made in the first two stages and on the players’ actual type profile            . 
The message to player 1 is    or    if  ’s type is    or   , respectively, and the message to 
player 2 is the pair of actions    
          
        . Thus, neither message reflects the player’s 
own type. It is not very difficult to check that the correlated strategy specifying that each 
player chooses the first or second action in his message if his type is    or   , respectively, 
gives the CED described above. For example, if            , the action profile is 
       
        , which is      ,      ,       or       with probability    ,    ,     and 
   , respectively. Therefore, the players’ actions are independent and are distributed as 
specified at the margins of the top-left box in Table 2.  25 
To show that the above correlated strategy (with the described mechanism with property  ) 
is a correlated equilibrium, it suffices to prove that, given that the type of player 1 is    and 
given the message he receives (which can be      ,      ,       or      ), the conditional 
probabilities of the following three events are equal: (i) player 2 has type    and he plays  , 
(ii) player 2 has type    and he plays  , and (iii) player 2 has type    and he plays  . As 
indicated above, such equality means that player 1 is indifferent between his two actions. 
The equality can be viewed as the conjunction of two equalities: (a) events (i) and (ii) have 
equal conditional probabilities, which are necessarily one-half the conditional probability 
that        , and (b) the latter is also equal to twice the conditional probability of (iii). To 
prove (a) it suffices to note that, given that            , the message    that player 1 
receives and the action   
        that player 2 takes are conditionally independent, and the 
probability that the latter is   is    . To prove (b), note, first, that by the specification of the 
mechanism and Bayes’ rule the conditional probability that        , given that player 1’s 
type is    and he receives the message      ,      ,       or      , is    ,    ,     or 
   , respectively. It is therefore sufficient to show that the conditional probability, given the 
same information, that         and   
            is    ,     ,     or    , respectively. 
This conditional probability is equal to the product of two terms: the condition probability 
that        , given that         and player 1’s message has the specified value; and the 
condition probability that   
           , given that             and    has that value. The 
first term is the complement of the conditional probability that        , and is hence    , 
   ,     or     if the message is      ,      ,       or      , respectively; and by the 
specification of the mechanism, the second term is    ,    ,     or    , respectively. 
Therefore, the product of the two terms is    ,     ,     or    , respectively, as had to be 
shown.   
The above CED, which as shown is both  - and  -implementable, is not implementable by 
any mechanism that has both properties, or even by a mechanism with properties     and  . 
To see this, consider any correlated strategy with a mechanism satisfying     and   that has 
the CSD specified by Table 2. Partition all the messages that player 1 may receive into four 
groups,      ,      ,       and      , according to the actions that player 1’s strategy 
assigns to the message when the player’s type is    (first entry) and    (second entry). 
Since the mechanism satisfies    , the probability of receiving a message that belongs to a 
particular group when player 2 has type    is the same for both types of player 1. Denote 
these probabilities by    
  ,    
  ,    
   and    
  . Let    
  ,    
  ,    
   and    
   be the corresponding 
probabilities for the case where player 2’s type is   . Since these messages induce the 
distributions of actions given in Table 2, the following equalities must hold: 
   
       
   
 
 
      
       
   
 
 
   
   
       
   
 
 
      
       
   
 
 
    
A necessary condition for the correlated strategy to be a correlated equilibrium is that type 
   of player 1 cannot increase the conditional expectation of his payoff by playing  ,  ,   or 
 , respectively, when the message he receives belongs to group      ,      ,       or 
(15) 
(16) 26 
      (so that his strategy specifies taking the opposite action). Since the mechanism 
satisfies  , for any type profile the message that player 1 receives is independent of player 
 ’s message, and hence of that player’s action. Thus, regardless of player 1’s type and the 
message he receives, player 2 plays   with probability    . The above necessary condition is 
therefore expressed by the following inequalities:  
   
    
 
 
     
 
 
          
   
 
 
     
 
 
          
   
    
 
 
     
 
 
          
   
 
 
     
 
 
          
   
   
 
 
     
 
 
          
    
 
 
     
 
 
          
   
   
 
 
     
 
 
          
    
 
 
     
 
 
          
All inequalities in (17) must in fact hold as equalities. If one of the first two inequalities or 
one of the last two were strict, then      
       
          
       
        or     
       
     
    
       
        would hold. These two inequalities are equivalent (since the probabilities in 
each quartet sum up to  ), and they contradict (15). Therefore, in particular, the first and 
third equalities in (17) hold as equalities, which implies      
       
          
       
       . 
This equation contradicts (16). The contradiction proves that a correlated strategy with a 
mechanism satisfying     and   that has the distribution specified by Table 2 cannot be a 
correlated equilibrium.  
The conjunction of  - and  -implementability (as in Example 4) and the conjunction of  - 
and  -implementability (Example 5) are two attributes of CEDs that have no parallels among 
the attributes of CSDs. A third attribute that is defined in a similar manner may exist, 
namely, the conjunction of    - and  -implementability. However, its existence is still an open 
question: it is not known whether this third attribute is indeed distinct from the second one. 
This uncertainty is represented in Figure 2 by the question mark. It is shown in Section ‎ 5.3 
below that, in any case, these two or three attributes of CEDs are the only ones that can be 
defined only by conjunctions; additional such attributes do not exist.  
3.2.3  Strategy correlated and type correlated equilibria 
As an illustration of the discussion in the previous subsections, this subsection describes in 
detail two of the attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions in Figure 2: 
 -implementability (attribute III), which is inherited from correlated strategy distributions, 
and the “spin-off” attribute    -implementability (attribute IIIa). Both attributes have been 
previously described in the literature, under various names. Correlated equilibria whose 
CEDs are    -implementable are called strategy correlated equilibria (Cotter, 1991), 
strategic form correlated equilibria (Forges, 1993, 2006) or normal form correlated equilibria 
(Lehrer et al., 2010). Correlated equilibria whose CEDs are  -implementable are called type 
correlated equilibria (Cotter, 1994) or agent normal form correlated equilibria (Forges, 1993, 
2006; Lehrer et al., 2006, 2010).  
In a strategy correlated equilibrium, a referee who does not know the players’ types 
confidentially recommends a strategy to each of them. The recommendations are thus 
independent of the players’ actual types but not necessarily of one another. The equilibrium 
(17) 27 
condition is that it is always optimal for each player to take the action that the strategy 
recommended by the referee prescribes to his actual type, assuming that all the other 
players do the same.
18 In the terminology of this work, a referee corresponds to a 
mechanism. The assumption that the referee does not know the players’ types corresponds 
to properties   and   of the mechanism, which together mean that the types do not affect 
the messages.  
A type correlated equilibrium differs from a strategy correlated equilibrium in that each 
player is told not the whole strategy but only the action it prescribes to his actual type. 
However, it is still assumed that the referee does not know the types when he chooses his 
recommendations. Hence, either he learns them later or there is something (e.g., a language 
barrier; see the example in the Introduction) that prevents players from learning what they 
are not supposed to know, namely, the actions that the strategy recommended by the 
referee prescribes to each of the other types of the same player. Either way, the message 
that each player receive may depend on his type, so that the mechanism only has property  . 
Forges (1993) showed that some type correlated equilibria are not equivalent to any 
strategy correlated equilibrium. The next example provides another demonstration of this 
result.   
Example 6. A correlated equilibrium distribution that is      - but not    -implementable.  
Two players play the coordination game 
       
 
 
    
   
    
Player 1 can be of type    or type   , which are both equally likely. Player 2 has the single 
type   . A mechanism bases its messages on the outcomes of two independent coin tosses, 
   and   , each of which gives   or   with equal probabilities. A player of type    or    
receives the message    or   , respectively. The correlated strategy of always acting 
according to the message is a correlated equilibrium. It gives the expected payoffs   and    , 
respectively, to types    and    of player 1, and      to player 2, and it is easy to check 
that, in all three cases, profitable deviations do not exist.  
The above mechanism has properties     and  . Whether player 1’s type is    or    does not 
affect the distribution of the message he receives (which has probability 0.5 of being   in 
both cases), and has no effect whatsoever on player  ’s message. The corresponding 
correlated equilibrium distribution is not implementable by any mechanism that satisfies   
and  , i.e., one in which both messages are unaffected by 1’s type. The reason is that, in any 
correlated equilibrium with a mechanism that has that property, the expected payoff for the 
two types of player 1 must be equal. Otherwise, one of them could increase his payoff by 
mimicking the way the other type reacts to the message he receives.  
                                                            
18 This verbal description of strategy correlated equilibrium is not entirely general, in that the 
recommendation that each player receives from the referee is an explicit strategy. In a more general 
setting, a device may send out messages that are arbitrary objects, and the translation into strategies 
for the receiving players is expressed by the correlated strategy. 28 
 
Figure 3. Hesse diagram of the different attributes of communication equilibrium distributions (MEDs) in 
Bayesian games, ordered by implication. Each attribute is represented by a box, and an implication relation is 
represented by a line. A conjunction symbol   means that the MED is implementable both by a mechanism 
satisfying one property (or pair of properties) and by a mechanism satisfying the other property. A line marked 
? represents an uncertain relation: it is not known whether the reverse implication also holds (in which case 
the two connected boxes should be coalesced).  
3.3  Attributes of communication equilibrium distributions 
A communication equilibrium in a Bayesian game is also a correlated equilibrium but the 
converse is generally not true. The incentive compatibility requirement for correlated 
equilibrium is that taking a different action than that prescribed by the correlated strategy 
cannot make a player better off. Communication equilibrium adds the requirement that 
reporting the types truthfully is incentive compatible. Obviously, the latter requirement has 
no bite if the mechanism ignores the players’ type reports, i.e., if it has properties   and  . 
Thus, if a CED is implementable by a mechanism with these properties, it is automatically a 
MED. Somewhat less trivially, it is shown below that    -implementability is the weakest 
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attribute of a CED in Figure 2 that guarantees that it is also a MED. Thus, for any list of 
properties of mechanisms that does not include   or  , some of the CEDs implementable by 
a mechanism with these properties are not MEDs. However, other such CEDs are MEDs, 
which raises the question of whether, also as MEDs, they are implementable by a 
mechanism with the same properties, i.e., whether there exists a communication 
equilibrium with such a mechanism that gives the distribution. Examples 7 and 8 below show 
that the answer to this question can be negative.  
Implementability by a mechanism with a particular set of properties is an attribute of MEDs, 
just as for CEDs and CSDs. As in Sections ‎ 3.1 and ‎ 3.2, a basic question, for each such attribute 
of MEDs or a conjunction of several attributes, is which of the other attributes are implied by 
it. The answer is given by the Hesse diagram in Figure 3, which presents the implication 
relations among the various attributes of communication equilibrium distributions. 
Comparison with the diagram for correlated equilibrium distributions (Figure 2) shows that, 
among the attributes of distributions that are defined by a single set of properties of 
mechanisms, the implications relations for MEDs and CEDs are identical. However, this is not 
so for attributes that are defined by conjunction, with the result that some such attributes 
are equivalent in the case of CEDs but distinct for MEDs. For example, for MEDs, unlike for 
CEDs, the conjunction of  - and  -implementability does not imply    -implementability.  
Example 7. A communication equilibrium distribution that is  - as well as  -implementable 
but not    -implementable. In a three-player Bayesian game, player 1 has two types,   
  and 
  
 . Players 2 and 3 both have the same two types,    and   . All type profiles except 
   
         may occur, and they have the same probability (   ). Each player can play   or  . 
Player 1’s payoff depends only on the type profile   and on the other players’ actions. 
Specifically, it can be different from   only if        
        , and in that case the payoff is 
given by the following symmetric matrix, in which the rows and columns correspond to the 
actions of players 2 and 3:  
         
 
 
      
    
    
For player 2 and for player 3 the payoff is the sum of two numbers. The first number is   if 
player 1 plays   and players 2 and 3 have identical types; it is   also if player 1 plays   and 
players 2 and 3 have different types; and it is   otherwise. The second number is     if the 
player’s own action is  ; and if the action is  , it is given by the following table, in which the 
rows describe the player’s own type and the columns describe the types of the other two 
players: 
    
       
       
       
    
  
  
                             
                           
   
Consider the function that, for each type profile  , assigns to player 1 the action   or   if the 
types of players 2 and 3 are identical or different, respectively, and assigns to players 2 and 3 
the actions specified by the following table, and which the rows and columns correspond to 
the player’s own type and to that of the other player, respectively: 30 
       
  
  
   
   
   
With the mechanism with property   that, for each type profile  , tells each player the 
action that the above function assigns him, the correlated strategy of acting accordingly is a 
communication equilibrium. Player 1 cannot increase his payoff of  , since there is no way 
he can make players 2 and 3 play   when they both have type   . And for these players, a 
truthful type report is incentive compatible, since if (only) one of them lies, both players 2 
and 3 lose the   they would get from a match between their types (identical or different) 
and player 1’s action (  or  , respectively). In addition, for players 2 and 3, acting according 
to the coordinated strategy is incentive compatible. For a player of type   , doing so always 
guarantees him maximum payoff, and for type   , deviating from the assigned action   to   
would decrease the expected payoff by (               )    . 
The communication equilibrium distribution described above is also implementable by a 
mechanism with property  . That mechanism sends to player 1 the same messages as 
above, and sends to each of the other two players   (     ) a message that depends on the 
others’ types according to the table 
    
       
       
       
    
                               
   
where         is a pair of dependant random variables that equals       with probability 
    and       with probability    . A communication equilibrium with this mechanism that 
gives the same distribution as the previous one is for each player to play according to the 
message he receives, unless he is of type   , in which case he should play  . For a player of 
that type (  ), playing   would not increase the conditional expectation of the payoff, 
regardless of the message he receives. This is because, given that the received message is   
or  , the conditional probability that the other players have types   
  and    is     or    , 
respectively. Since both         and         are greater than    , deviation to   is 
unwarranted in both cases. The incentive compatibility of truthful type reports is proved by 
arguments similar to those used for the previous equilibrium. 
There is no communication equilibrium with a mechanism with properties   and   that gives 
the above distribution. To see this, suppose that such a communication equilibrium exists. 
Since property   implies    , the distribution of the messages that player 3 gets from the 
mechanism only depends on the other players’ types, so that it can be described by the table  
    
       
       
       
    
                              
   
where   ,   ,   ,    are four probability measures on player 3’s message space   . If the 
type of player 3 is   , he should play   or   if he receives any message in          or in 
                   , respectively. Therefore, these two subsets of    must be disjoint. If 
the type of player 3 is   , he should play   regardless of the message    he receives. 
Deviation to   should not increase the conditional expectation of the player’s payoff, which 




              
 
 
          
 
 
          
 
 
              










     
It follows that if the type profile is    
        , the probability that player 3 plays   is at least 
   . The same is true for player 2. Therefore, by the assumed independence of the 
messages (property  ), the probability that both 2 and 3 play   when the type profile is 
   
         is at least     . Since                            , this shows that player 1 
has an incentive to misreport his type as   
  when it is really   
 , which contradicts the 
equilibrium assumption.  
The MED in Examples 7 is not    -implementable, although it is ( - and  -implementable, 
and hence)    -implementable as a CED. The next example demonstrates another difference 
of this kind between MEDs and CEDs. The special significance of this example is that it shows 
that these solution concepts are not connected by a relation similar to that in Theorem 1, 
which concerns CEDs and CSDs. The example is taken from Gerardy (2004, Example 2). 
Example 8. A communication equilibrium distribution that is not  -implementable but does 
have that attribute as a correlated equilibrium distribution. In a three-player Bayesian game, 
player 1 has two types,   
  and   
 , player 2 has two types,   
  and   
 , and player 3 has a single 
type. Types   
  and   
  cannot occur together, but all the other three type profiles are 
possible and equally probable. Players 1 and 2 have a single action, and player 3 has four 
actions:   
    
    
    
 . The four payoff vectors that correspond to the four actions, for each 
type profile, are given by the following table. 
    






                                                                     
                                     
   
For each of the three possible type profiles there are either one or two actions for player 3 
that yield him his maximum payoff of  . There are four different ways to choose one such 
action for each type profile, and each such choice of actions specifies an    - (but not    -) 
implementable CED. However, it can be shown that only one of these four CEDs is also a 
MED, namely, the one in which player 3 chooses his first action   
  if the other players’ types 
are   
  and   
  and chooses the second action   
  otherwise. In addition, in any 
communication equilibrium, player 3 randomizes exactly fifty-fifty between   
  and   
  if the 
impossible type combination    
    
   is reported; otherwise, truthful type reports are not 
incentive compatible. The above MED is therefore    - but not  -implementable.  
The existence in Example 8 of three    -implementable CEDs that are not MEDs shows that 
this attribute of CEDs is insufficient to make them MEDs. Example 6 proves that      -
implementability is also insufficient. This is because, in the CED considered in that example, 
the otherwise identical two types of player 1 receive different payoffs, which is impossible in 32 
a MED. Together, these examples prove that the only attributes of CEDs in Figure 2 that 
necessarily make them MEDs are those that imply    -implementability. 
Example 8 also shows that a result similar to Corollary 1 does not hold for communication 
equilibrium distributions: the canonical strategy, with the canonical mechanism, is not 
necessarily a communication equilibrium. The reason for this fundamental difference 
between communication and correlated equilibria is that, in the former unlike the latter, the 
messages that the mechanism sends when it receives type reports that are patently not all 
truthful (since the profile lies outside the support of the distribution of type profiles) cannot 
be chosen arbitrarily. The mechanism’s reaction to such reports has to induce actions that 
punish the player who lied about his type, whose identity may or may not be inferable. The 
feasibility of such a reaction may depend on the properties of the implementing mechanism. 
Hence the difference between Figure 2 and Figure 3.     
The differences between the attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions and those of 
communication equilibrium distributions are not limited to differences between the 
respective Hesse diagrams. As Examples 7 and 8 show, they involve not only the number of 
attributes and the relations between them but also the placement of individual distributions. 
The same distribution may be assigned to either of two non-corresponding classes 
depending on whether it is viewed as a CED or as a MED. The classifications of CSDs, CEDs 
and MEDs, which are derived from the respective Hesse diagrams, are described in detail in 
the next subsection. 
3.4  Classifications  
A significant property of the collections of attributes of distributions that are described in 
the preceding three subsections is that each of them is closed under conjunctions. That is, 
each collection includes every attribute that can be defined as the conjunction of several of 
its elements, i.e., as the quality of possessing all of these attributes. This result is formally 
expressed by the following theorem, and it is proved by Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 in Sections ‎ 4, ‎ 5 
and ‎ 6 below. 
Theorem 2. The conjunction of any number of the attributes of CSDs in Figure 1, CEDs in 
Figure 2, or MEDs in Figure 3 is equivalent to one of the attributes in the same figure. 
Each of the collections of attributes of CSDs, CEDs, and MEDs in the above figures is also a 
lattice with respect to the implication relation. That is, in each of the three Hesse diagrams, 
every two attributes have a greatest lower bound (or infimum) and a least upper bound (or 
supremum). The greatest lower bound, also called the meet of the two attributes, is the 
unique attribute in the diagram that (i) implies both attributes and (ii) is implied by every 
other attribute in the diagram that implies them. The least upper bound, also called the join 
of the two attributes, is the unique attribute that (i) is implied by each of the two attributes 
and (ii) implies every other attribute in the diagram that is implied by each of them. The 
meet and join operations are customarily denoted by   and ∨ respectively. Theorem 2 
implies that this notation is consistent with the use of   in Figure 2 and Figure 3 as the 
symbol for logical conjunction. By the theorem, in each Hesse diagram, the conjunction of 
any two attributes is equivalent to some attribute in the same diagram. That attribute is 33 
clearly the meet of the first two: it implies each of them, and it is implied by any other 
attribute that does the same. 
A CSD, CED, or MED in a Bayesian game usually has more than one of the attributes of 
distributions of that kind that are described in this paper. Specifically, if it has a particular 
attribute, then it also possesses every other attribute that is implied by the first one. For 
example, every random-profile distribution (attribute III in Figure 1) also has the conditional 
independence property (property II). However, as the following theorem shows, among all 
the attributes in Figure 1, Figure 2 or Figure 3 that a given CSD, CED or MED has, there is 
always one that implies all the others; it is its strongest attribute. Clearly, specifying the 
strongest attribute is equivalent to specifying the whole collection of attributes that the 
distribution possesses. 
Theorem 3. For every correlated strategy distribution  , the collection of all the attributes in 
Figure 1 that   possesses includes one attribute that implies all the others. The same is true 
for correlated equilibrium distributions and for communication equilibrium distributions, 
except that for these the relevant attributes are those in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. 
Theorem 3 is an immediate corollary of the closedness under conjunctions. By Theorem 2, 
the conjunction of all the attributes that a distribution   possesses is equivalent to one of 
the attributes in the relevant Hesse diagram. Since equivalence means two-way implication, 
it follows that (i)   has that attribute, and (ii) the attribute implies all the other attributes 
that   possesses. Parenthetically, Theorem 3 does not simply follow from the observation 
that each of the three Hesse diagrams is a lattice (or vice versa). Removing VIb, for example, 
from Figure 2 would invalidate the theorem, but the Hesse diagram would still represent a 
lattice.  
As an illustration of Theorem 3, consider a CED that is implementable both by a mechanism 
with property     and by a mechanism with property  . That CED must be a pure-equilibrium 
distribution. This is because the only attribute in Figure 2 that is stronger than (i.e., implies 
both)    -implementability and  -implementability is      -implementability. 
Classification according to the strongest attribute partitions the collection of all CSDs into 7 
nonempty and mutually disjoint classes. The partition for CEDs, which is finer than (that 
inherited from) the former, has 14 or 15 elements, and for MEDs the number of classes is 15, 
16 or 17.
19 Each of these classes can be designated by the same roman number and (if 
applicable) subscript letter that designate the corresponding attribute in Figure 1, Figure 2 or 
Figure 3. For example, class II of CSDs consists of all the correlated strategy distributions 
with the conditional independence property which are not random-profile distributions.   
3.5  Payoffs 
The purpose of Example 6 is to demonstrate that the joint distributions of type and action 
profiles achievable by strategy correlated equilibria are not identical to those achievable by 
type correlated equilibria. It demonstrates that by showing that the two kinds of equilibria 
                                                            
19 Although the ranges of possible cardinalities overlap, it follows from Example 7 and Lemma 22 
below that the number of classes of MEDs is strictly greater than for CEDs. 34 
may give different expected payoffs to certain types of players. Forges’ (1993) 
demonstration of the nonequivalence of strategy correlated and type correlated equilibria, 
which is considerably more involved than Example 6, seemingly goes further by showing that 
even the players’ payoffs, which combine those of all their types, may be different for the 
two kinds of equilibria. However, it follows from the next theorem that to study the effect of 
the properties of the implementing mechanism on the correlated equilibrium payoffs (CEPs), 
which are the  -tuples giving the players’ expected payoffs in the correlated equilibria in an 
 -player Bayesian game, it is in fact not necessary to actually examine these payoffs, as 
Forges (1993, 2006) did. It suffices to solve the more tractable problem of CED 
implementability (Section ‎ 3.2). This is because any two kinds of mechanisms (of those 
considered in Figure 2) that do not implement the same CEDs necessarily also do not 
implement the same CEPs (and, obviously, vice versa). A similar relation exists between 
correlated strategy distributions (Section ‎ 3.1) and correlated strategy payoffs (CSPs), and 
between communication equilibrium distributions (Section ‎ 3.1‎ 3.3) and communication 
equilibrium payoffs (MEPs). The proof of the theorem, which is given in Section ‎ 7, is 
constructive. It thus provides a means of automatically turning an example such as Example 
6 into one that involves different payoff vectors (rather than just different joint distributions 
of types and actions).   
Theorem 4.  For any two subsets   and   of the properties (of mechanisms)                  , 
the proposition  
 -implementability implies  -implementability 
holds for correlated strategy distributions, correlated equilibrium distributions or 
communication equilibrium distributions if and only if it holds for correlated strategy 
payoffs, correlated equilibrium payoffs or communication equilibrium payoffs, respectively. 
Moreover, the same is true with the premise “ -implementability” replaced by “  -
implementability and   -implementability and …”, for any list          of subsets of 
                 . 
The gist of Theorem 4 is that the Hesse diagrams in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 apply not 
only to CSDs, CEDs and MEDs, respectively, but also to CSPs, CEPs and MEPs. Moreover, the 
classifications of CSPs, CEPs and MEDs by the properties of the implementing mechanisms 
are identical to the classifications of CSDs, CEDs and MEDs described in Section ‎ 3.4. 
Therefore, the notation used for the various classes of distributions may also be used for the 
corresponding classes of payoff vectors. For example, Class I of CEPs consists of all the 
correlated equilibrium payoffs (in specified Bayesian games) that are not    - or  -
implementable. 
This concludes the summary of the main results in this paper. The following sections present 
these results in detail and give their proofs.  
4  Correlated Strategy Distributions 
One of the goals of this paper is to identify new attributes of correlated strategy 
distributions. It would seem natural to base the classification on the intrinsic properties of 35 
CSDs, that is, properties that can easily be expressed in terms of the distributions 
themselves, as in Lemma 2. Indeed, this is the prevalent approach in the literature. 
However, an alternative approach turns out to be quite fruitful. This approach, which forms 
the basis for this work, is to classify CSDs according to the properties of the mechanisms 
implementing them. Characterization in terms of intrinsic properties is the second step.   
The classification of CSDs is based on the six properties of mechanisms described in Section 
‎ 2.2, namely,  ,    ,  ,    ,   and  . Each subset   of these properties defines an attribute of 
CSDs, namely,  -implementability. A CSD is  -implementable if it is implementable by some 
mechanism with (all) the properties in  . If   and   are two subsets of properties,  -
implementability implies  -implementability if in every Bayesian game every  -
implementable CSD is also  -implementable. Shorthand for this relation is  
       
A trivial sufficient condition for it is reverse inclusion,      .  -implementability and  -
implementability are comparable if (18) or the reverse implication holds, and equivalent if 
both implications hold. Shorthand for equivalence is  
      
The connection between properties of mechanisms and attributes of CSDs can be extended 
by considering pairs of subsets of                  . Each such pair,   and   , defines an 
attribute of CSDs , namely, the conjunction of  -implementability and   -implementability, 
which is denoted by  
        
A CSD with this attribute is implementable both by a mechanism with the properties in   
and by a (generally different) mechanism with the properties in   . However, Lemma 5 at 
the end of this section shows that no new attributes are defined this way, since every CSD as 
above is also implementable by a mechanism that has both the properties in   and those in 
  .  
A simple and natural mechanism that implements any given CSD is its canonical mechanism 
(see Section ‎ 2.3). The following useful lemma identifies several attributes of CSDs that only 
depend on properties of their canonical mechanism.  
Lemma 4. A CSD is    -,  - or  - implementable if and only if its canonical mechanism has 
property    ,   or  , respectively.  
Proof. Consider a CSD   and its canonical mechanism              . Let   be any 
correlated strategy with a mechanism    such that   is equal to the joint distribution of the 
random type profile   and the random action profile   that is defined by a similar equation 
to (7) except that    replaces  . By definition of the canonical mechanism,  
      
 
          
      
   
                
(18) 
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If    satisfies  , then the entries on the right-hand side of the equality are independent, and 
therefore (4) holds. A special property of the canonical mechanism is that (4) also holds for 
all             , which proves that   satisfies  . 
Another special property of the canonical mechanism is that, for every   and  , there is some 
   with        
               such that (2) holds, and hence (by (19)) 
       
 
        
        
      
If    satisfies  , then the expression on the right-hand side has a degenerate distribution, 
which proves that   satisfies  . If    satisfies    , then the distribution of the expression on 
the right-hand side is unaffected by replacing    with an arbitrary type profile   , and the 
equation that results from this replacement proves that   also satisfies    .  ∎ 
Lemma 4 cannot unfortunately be extended to all attributes of CSDs. In particular, as 
indicated in Section ‎ 2.2.1, the canonical mechanism of an  -implementable CSD does not 
necessarily have property  . However, every  -implementable CSD   is implementable by a 
mechanism                   with property   that is functionally indistinguishable from the 
canonical mechanism              , in that 
        
 
                    
Such a mechanism can be constructed by taking any mechanism                 with 
property   that implements   and a corresponding correlated strategy  , and defining  
                   
                    
It follows from (19) that this mechanism is functionally indistinguishable from the canonical 
one, which implies that   is obtained also from using the canonical strategy with the 
mechanism    . 
4.1  Intrinsic characterizations 
This subsection presents intrinsic characterizations for several attributes of CSDs, which 
represent an alternative to definitions by properties of the implementing mechanisms. The 
first two propositions are reworded versions of results presented in Section ‎ 3.1.1. 
Proposition 1. A CSD   is      -implementable if and only if the following condition holds 
for some (equivalently, every) pair of random variables                  and    
             whose joint distribution is  :  
(i)  For each player  ,    and           are conditionally independent, given   .  
A CSD is      -implementable if and only if it satisfies the stronger condition in which (i) is 
replaced by: 
(ii)  For each player  , the conditional distribution of   , given   , is degenerate. 
Proof. To prove the sufficiency of the condition for      -implementability, let   be the 
canonical mechanism of   and          the canonical random action profile. Suppose that 
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(i) holds. For every type profile              and action profile  ,  
                                                                 
                                            
                                                          
where the second equality follows from (i) and the subsequent equalities follow from using 
an identical trick for the other entries of  . This proves that            are conditionally 
independent, given  . By (i), for every type profile    with        
              , each 
expression in (21) of the form                   is equal to                       
    . 
Therefore, since         , (21) and the second part of property (5) of the canonical 
mechanism imply that, for             ,       and any       , 
                                              
         
 
   
  
Assume, without loss of generality, that the indexing of the players’ types (see Section ‎ 2.1) is 
such that         
    
      
             . For each  , let                                        
be the random variable with values in   
       
          
   that is defined by 
                 
     
         
     
               
The message that each player   receives from the mechanism                   is a pure 
strategy of the form    
    
         
  , where each action   
  coincides with the message 
that the player would receive from the canonical mechanism   if his type were   
  (the 
player’s  th type) and the other players’ types were given by    
  . Since this description does 
not involve in any way the actual type profile  , the mechanism     satisfies   and  . To 
prove that it also satisfies  , it has to be shown that for any   
    
        ,   
    
        , ..., 
  
    
        , 
        
     
        
       
     
        
         
     
        
       
     
        
      
           
     
        
       
     
        
    
 
   
  
By (6), the left-hand side is equal to  
              
    
      
                 
     
        
          
     
        
     
 
   
 
By the second equality in (22) (used with            ), this proves that  
        
     
        
       
     
        
         
     
        
       
     
        
      
            
     
        
  
   
 
   
  
By (6) again, (25) proves (24), so that the mechanism     satisfies  . To prove that it 






    by  
       
     
    
          
                    
Thus, according to     , of all the entries in the message, player   takes the one corresponding 
to his actual type. It has to be shown that 
                
 
                                                             
For this, it suffices to show that, for every              and      ,  
               
                                                                                    
By (22), this equation holds if and only if   
             
         
 
   
                                                                              
By (26) and (23), the left-hand side is equal to  
                           
 
   
  
and by property   of the mechanism    , the right-hand side is also equal to this product. 
Therefore, the equality holds. 
Establishing the sufficiency of the condition for      -implementability only requires the 
following short addition to the above proof. Suppose that (ii) (rather than the weaker 
condition (i)) holds. It has to be shown that the mechanism     satisfies   (rather than only 
 ). By (23), it suffices to show that for every        and       the distribution of the random 
variable           is degenerate. By the second part of property (5) of the canonical 
mechanism, it suffices to restrict attention to type profiles    in         , for which the 
distribution is equal to the conditional distribution of      , given that       . Since 
        , by (ii) that distribution is degenerate. 
It remains to prove the necessity of the conditions in the proposition. Every CED is the joint 
distribution of pair of random variables   and   such that (7) holds for some correlated 
strategy   with a mechanism  . Moreover,   and   are independent, and therefore  
                                                                     
It follows from (27) that if the mechanism   satisfies  , then the probability on the left-
hand side is either   or  , and if   satisfies    , then, for every      ,              and 
     ,  




If   satisfies  , then (in view of (7)) the actions            are conditionally independent, 
given  , and therefore, for every      ,              and      , 
                                                        
Multiplying both sides by the conditional probability                       gives  
                                                                                
Therefore, if a CSD   is both    - and  -implementable (and, a fortiori, if it is      -
implementable), then every   and   whose joint distribution is   satisfy (28) and (29), and 
hence also  
                                                                                  
for every                    and      . This property is equivalent to condition (ii). If   is 
in addition  -implementable (and, a fortiori, if it is      -implementable), then the 
expression on the right-hand side of (28) is either   or  , which gives (i). ∎ 
Proposition 2. A CSD   is    -implementable if and only if there is a probability measure   
on   
       
          
   such that   
                                               
where    is the distribution of type profiles and    is the marginal measure defined by 
(14).  
Proof. To prove the sufficiency of the condition, suppose that a measure   as above exists 
for a CSD  . Restrict   to its support  , and let the random variable   be the identity map on 
 . By construction,   is independent of the random type profile  . Define a mechanism 
              by 
                        
This mechanism clearly has properties   and  . The message space of each player is  , 
each element   of which is a pure-strategy profile    
    
      
    
        
    
     
(where, for each   and  ,   
  is the action prescribed to player  ’s  th type). Define a 
correlated strategy   with the mechanism   by  
     
         
                    
Thus, the strategy for each player is simply to take the action prescribed to his actual type. It 
has to be shown that the joint distribution of   and the random action profile   
corresponding to   is  . By (30), this means that the following has to be established:  
                                               
By (7) and (31), for any type profile        
     
       
   , 
                           
           
             






By (32), the right-hand side is the  -measure of the set of all pure-strategy profiles 
   
    
      
    
        
    
     with    
     
       
       , which by definition (Eq. (14)) 
is equal to        . Thus, (33) holds, so that   implements the CSD  . 
To prove the necessity of the condition for    -implementability, consider a CSD   that is 
equal to the joint distribution of a pair of random variables   and   such that (7) holds for a 
correlated strategy   with a mechanism   that satisfies   (and may or may not satisfy  ). 
Fix a type profile   . The random variable  
                 
     
     
                 
     
     
                   
     
     
  
returns values in   
       
          
  , i.e., pure-strategy profiles. Its distribution   is given 
by  
      
    
      
    
                   
       
     
         
       
       
     
    
    
         
       
     
         
       
       
     
         
        
For every type profile        
     
       
    and action profile                , 
      
    
      
    
        
    
         
       
          
       
     
       
          
          
        
      
               
        
      
                 
        
      
      
                                                                     
where the last equality uses the assumption that   has property  . By (14) and (7), this 
shows that (33) holds, which gives (30). ∎ 
Proposition 3. A CSD   is    -implementable if and only if it has the conditional independence 
property. 
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that the canonical mechanism   of   has 
property     if and only if the condition in Definition 3 holds for the random type profile   and 
the canonical random action profile         . The condition in the definition is the 
requirement that, for every player   and type    for that player, 
                      
                             
               
for all type profiles    and     with        
           
               . Since         , (34) is 
equivalent to 
         
     
 
         
      
It follows from the second part of property (5) of the canonical mechanism that (35) holds 
for all type profiles    and     with        
           
                if and only if it holds for all    
and    . This is so for every player   and type    if and only if   has property    .  ∎ 
Proposition 4. A CSD   is  -implementable if and only if the following condition holds for 
some (equivalently, every) pair of random variables   and                  whose joint 
distribution is  : 
(34) 
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(i)      
    are conditionally independent, given  .  
A CSD is  -implementable if and only if it satisfies the stronger condition in which (i) is 
replaced by: 
(ii)  The conditional distribution of   given   is degenerate. 
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that the canonical mechanism   of   has 
property   or   if and only if (i) or (ii), respectively, holds for the random type profile   and 
the canonical random action profile         . In other words, condition (4) or (3) holds for 
all type profiles   if and only if the condition holds for all             . This equivalence is 
implied by property (5) of the canonical mechanism.    ∎ 
4.2  Equivalences 
This subsection identifies equivalent formulations for the attributes of CSDs considered in 
the previous subsection.  
Proposition 5. For CSDs,                  ,                            ,                      , 
                      and                      .  
Proof. Since property   of mechanisms implies    , and therefore                  , to prove 
that these three attributes are equivalent it suffices to show that every CSD is  -
implementable.  
Let   be the canonical mechanism of a CSD  . It implements   but does not necessarily have 
property   (see Section ‎ 2.2.1). To obtain an implementing mechanism that has that 
property, let                                                  for each type profile   be the random 
variable with values in   
       
          
   that is defined by 
                   
            
                  
This definition differs from that in (23) in that the partial type profile on the right-hand side 
is     rather than the constant one    
  . Hence, the mechanism                         only satisfies 
 . With this mechanism, the correlated strategy     defined in (26) gives the canonical random 
action profile:  
                                    
This proves that the mechanism        implements  .  
The proofs that                       and                       are very similar, and only 
require the following additions to the above proof.  
If the CSD   is  - or  -implementable, then by Lemma 4 the canonical mechanism   has 
property   or  , respectively. Since a canonical mechanism also satisfies (6), the random 
variables  
       




are independent in both cases, and in the case of  -implementability their distributions are 
moreover degenerate. It follows that, for every type profile  , the same is true for the   
random variables 
            
      
each of which is a vector whose entries are a subset of the random variables in (38), such 
that these   subsets are disjoint. This shows that, if   is  - or  -implementable, then the 
mechanism        satisfies   or  , respectively, as well as  . 
To prove that                            , it suffices to show that    -implementability implies 
     -implementability. In fact, in view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that if the canonical 
mechanism   satisfies    , then        also satisfies    . If the former condition holds, then, for 
every player   and type profiles    and    , (35) holds for all types   , which by (6) implies  
      
     
         
     
        
 
      
     
          
     
         
Thus,        has property    . 
To prove that                      , it suffices to show that            . This is shown in 
the proof of Proposition 2, where it is proved that the existence of a measure   as in that 
proposition implies    -implementability and it is implied by  -implementability.  ∎ 
Proposition 6. For CSDs,                                                                  
              and                                                                  
             . 
Proof. It clearly suffices to show that                         and                        . As 
shown in the last part of the proof of Proposition 1, every CSD that is both    - and  -
implementable, or both    - and  -implementable, respectively, is the joint distribution of a 
pair of random variables   and   that satisfies condition (i) or (ii) in Proposition 1. Therefore, 
by that proposition, in the first case the CSD is also      -implementable, and in the second 
case it is      -implementable.  ∎ 
4.3  Implications 
Propositions 5 and 6 identify seven attributes of correlated strategy distributions that are 
defined by subsets of the six properties of mechanisms defined in Section ‎ 2.2. Figure 1 
presents these classes as well as certain trivial implication relations among them, which all 
follow immediately from relations between properties of mechanisms. To prove that the 
figure presents a complete picture of the implication relations between attributes of CSDs, it 
remains to show that implications additional to those shown do not hold, so that, in 
particular, none of the seven attributes is equivalent to another. For this, the following four 
propositions are required. 
Proposition 7. For CSDs,              . 43 
Proof. It suffices to consider any complete information game, that is, a game where every 
player has only one type, with a mixed-strategy profile that is not pure.  ∎ 
Proposition 8. For CSDs,              . 
Proof. In a two-player Bayesian game in which player 1 has a single type and two actions and 
player 2 has a single action and two types, consider a correlated strategy distribution in 
which player 1 takes his first or second action if player 2 is of the first or second type, 
respectively. This CSD is implementable by mechanism that simply tells player 1 the type of 
player 2, and thus satisfies   and  . However, the CSD is not    -implementable, since with a 
mechanism that satisfies    , player 1 cannot possibly know player  ’s type.  ∎ 
Proposition 9. For CSDs,            .  
Proof. By Example 1, there exists a CSD that has the conditional independence property but 
is not    -implementable. By Proposition 3, that CSD is    -implementable, and by 
Proposition 5, it is not  -implementable.  ∎ 
Proposition 10. For CSDs,            . 
Proof. In a complete information game, properties   and   automatically hold for every 
mechanism, but a CSD is  -implementable only if the players’ actions are independent.  ∎ 
Proposition 7 proves that attribute V only implies the other attributes in Figure 1 that the 
diagram indicates it implies (in other words, it does not imply VI or VII). Proposition 8 proves 
the same for attribute VI. These two results prove that attribute IV (which is implied by both 
V and VI) only implies attribute I, and therefore the latter does not imply II. Proposition 9 
proves that II does not imply III. Proposition 10 proves that attribute III only implies the 
(two) attributes that the diagram indicates it implies, which establishes the same for 
attribute II and for attribute I.  
Since, for mechanisms, property   implies    , property   implies    , and   implies  , there are 
only 27 relevant subsets of                  , which all appear in Figure 1. Therefore, there are 
no additional attributes of CSDs that can be described by single subsets of the six properties 
of mechanisms. The following lemma shows that the same is true for pairs (hence also 
triplets, etc.) of sets of properties of mechanisms: no additional attributes of CSDs can be 
defined by them.  
Lemma 5. For CSDs, for every two subsets                        ,  
                 
Proof (an outline). Proposition 6 proves the special case of (39) in which           and   
is either     or    . By inspection of Figure 1, every other case follows from one of these 
two.                      ∎ 
As indicated in Section ‎ 3.2.2 (see also Section ‎ 5.3), for correlated equilibrium distributions a 
similar result to Lemma 5 does not hold. In other words, the requirement of incentive 
compatibility may invalidate the equivalence (39).  
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5  Correlated Equilibrium Distributions 
The analysis of correlated strategy distributions in the previous section is a first step in the 
analysis of correlated equilibrium distributions. The former concerns qualitative differences 
between distributions that reflect the limited capabilities of the implementing mechanisms. 
The latter also incorporates the constraints inherent in the incentive compatibility 
requirement. Whereas in the case of CSDs the limiting factor is the mechanism’s ability to 
transmit information to players, in the case of CEDs its ability to do so selectively also comes 
into play.  
As for CSDs, each subset   of the six properties of mechanisms described in Section ‎ 2.2 
defines an attribute of correlated strategy distributions, namely,  -implementability. A CED 
has this attribute if it is implementable by some mechanism with (all) the properties in  . 
Note that in the present context implementability has a different meaning than for CSDs 
(Section ‎ 4). Here, the correlated strategy involved is required to be a correlated equilibrium. 
Thus, an expression like (18) has a different meaning for CSDs and CEDs. Wherever confusion 
is possible, the generic implication sign may be replaced by the more explicit one   
   
 or   
   
. 
The following proposition shows that the second of these relations is in a sense stronger 
than the first one. 
Proposition 11. For every two subsets                        , 
   
   
  implies    
   
   
Moreover, the same is true with   replaced by by            ,
20 for any list         of 
subsets of                  . 
Proof. It has to be shown that (i)    
   
  and (ii)    
   
  are contradictory. Condition (i) 
means that, in every Bayesian game, every  -implementable CED is also  -implementable. 
Condition (ii) means that there is some CSD in some Bayesian game that is  - but not  -
implementable. Without loss of generality, the payoff functions in that game (which are 
irrelevant for CSD implementability) are identically zero. However, this means that every 
correlated strategy in the game is a correlated equilibrium and vice versa, which contradicts 
(i). 
Consider now any list         of subsets of                  . Denote             by  . 
Trivially,    
   
              holds. It follows from Lemma 5 that                
   
  
holds. Together with (40), this gives that 
               
   
   implies                 
   
   
   ∎ 
The converse of (40) does not generally hold. Consequently, the attributes of CEDs that can 
be described in terms of the six properties of mechanisms do not all correspond to attributes 
                                                            
20 The definition of the conjunction of three or more attributes is the natural extension of the 
definition for two attributes. 
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of CSDs. In other words, the former are not simply the restrictions of the latter to correlated 
equilibrium distributions. Rather, restriction is followed by refinement, which gives rise to 
additional attributes. Some of the attributes of CEDs, including the majority of those 
inherited from CSDs, are presented in the following subsection. The subsequent subsection 
describes additional attributes, by specifically identifying all instances in which the converse 
of (40) does not hold. The last subsection completes the description of the implication 
relation   
   
 (henceforth written simply as  ) by considering implications involving 
conjunctions of attributes of CEDs.  
5.1  Equivalences 
The following propositions identify equivalent formulations for several attributes of CEDs. 
Proposition 12. For CEDs,                            . 
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that if the canonical mechanism   of a CED   
has property    , then the correlated strategy     with the mechanism        constructed in the 
proof of Proposition 5 is a correlated equilibrium. As shown in that proof, if the canonical 
mechanism satisfies    , then        satisfies   and    .  
By Lemma 3, condition (11) is satisfied by the random type profile   and the canonical 
random action profile         . By (37),     is a correlated equilibrium if and only if  
                    
                                    
        
Therefore, a sufficient condition for     to be a correlated equilibrium is that the conditional 
expectations in (11) and (41) are equal. The formal difference between them is that player 
 ’s action            in the former is replaced in the latter by           , which by (36) specifies 
not only the message that player   receives from the canonical mechanism (which is      ) 
but also the messages he would receive if his type were different. Therefore, the meaning of 
the above equality is that these messages do not provide player   with any information that 
he could use for choosing a better action.  
Since         , if the conditional expectations in (11) and (41) were not equal, then by (36) 
there would be some type of player  , say the first one   
 , and some messages   
    
    
such that  
           
                  
        
                
       
           
  
             
                  
        
                
       
           
       
           
      
The inequality implies that the pair of random variables   and     
       is not independent 
of      
            
        . However, if the canonical mechanism   has property    , then 
is follows from (6) that such independence does in fact hold, so that the above inequality 
cannot hold, which proves that     is a correlated equilibrium.  ∎ 
Proposition 13. For CEDs,              . 
Proof. It suffices to show that for every correlated equilibrium   with a mechanism   that 
satisfies   there is another correlated equilibrium     with a mechanism     that satisfies     
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and   such that the two correlated equilibria have identical CEDs. The correlated 
equilibrium     and the mechanism     are constructed below. The construction uses a random 
variable   that is uniformly distributed on the half-open interval       and is independent of 
 . (The assumption of uniform distribution, which is inconsistent with the definition of 
random variable in footnote 2, is only temporary. Below,   is replaced by a random variable 
that is defined on a finite probability space.)  
The idea of the proof is to encode the messages that the mechanism   sends in a particular 
way. Suppose, without loss of generality, that these messages are integers, more specifically, 
that the (finite) message space of each player   has the form             . Since property 
  of the mechanism implies    , the (random) message       to player   has a distribution 
function       that only depends on the player’s own type   . Thus, for any    , 
                                            
The mechanism     combines the message       and the random variable   in the following 
manner: 
                                                     
It is not difficult to see that the random variable          is uniformly distributed on the unit 
interval for every   and  . Therefore, the mechanism                   satisfies     as well as  . 
Note that, strictly speaking, the above construction does not conform to the definition of 
mechanism since the message spaces are infinite. A variant that does not have this problem 
is described below. 
The next step is to define the correlated strategy    . For each player  ,      is defined by 
                                  , where    is a function that “decodes” the message          and 
recovers the original message      : 
                                            
By virtue of this decoding,      always specifies the same action as   . Since, in addition, the 
messages that the players receive from the mechanism     convey precisely the same 
information as those from  , this proves that    , like  , is a correlated equilibrium.  
It remains to replace the uniformly-distribution random variable   with one that has only 
finitely many possible values, specifically, with the random variable     , where   is a real-
valued function with a finite range. The first step is to consider the (finite) set  
               
       
 
of all values that may appear in the first term in (42). The next step is to modify the 
definition of the mechanism     by changing the message that it sends to each player   from 
         (which is defined by (42)) to            , where                 is the left continuous 
function defined by                            . This change is inconsequential. Since 
always                                      , applying the decoder    to the modified message 
            still recovers      . Let the function                 be defined by  
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It is not difficult to see that the function   is well defined and, as required, has only finitely 
many possible values. The final step is to replace   in (42) with     . By definition of  , this 
replacement does not change the message            .  ∎ 
Proposition 14. For CEDs,                 and                .  
Proof. To prove that                , it has to be shown that every CED implementable by a 
mechanism   with properties     and   is also implementable by a mechanism with 
properties   and  .  
Property     of   means that for every type profile   and player   the distribution of       
does not change when only player  ’s type    changes. In other words, the distribution only 
depends on   and the partial type profile    . Therefore, it is possible to construct a family 
         of independent random variables, indexed by the players and partial type profiles, 
such that each entry        has the distribution described above. For each  , define  
                                   
Thus, 
          
 
                     
The mechanism                   has properties   and   by construction. Since   also has 
property  , it follows from (43) that  
        
 
             
which shows that the two mechanisms are functionally indistinguishable. It is not difficult to 
see that a correlated strategy with one mechanism is a correlated equilibrium if and only if 
the same correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium with the other mechanism. 
Therefore, the two mechanisms implement precisely the same CEDs.  
An almost identical proof shows that                . The only required change it to assume 
that the mechanism   has properties     and  . This assumption implies that for every   the 
distribution of      is degenerate, which by (44) implies the same for       . Thus,     
satisfies  .  ∎ 
Proposition 15. For CEDs,                                                                  
              and                                                                  
             . 
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that if the canonical mechanism   of a CED   
has property     as well as   or  , then   is      - or      -implementable, respectively. It is 
shown by Proposition 6 that, as a CSD,   is indeed thus implementable. The proof of that 
proposition refers to the proof of Proposition 1, where it is shown that the mechanism     
(43) 
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defined by (23) has the relevant three properties, and with that mechanism, the correlated 
strategy     defined in (26) gives  . Therefore, it only remains to show that the correlated 
strategy     with the mechanism     is in fact a correlated equilibrium.  
As shown in proof of Proposition 12,     is a correlated equilibrium with the mechanism        
defined by (36). This mechanism and     are both based on the canonical mechanism  , and 
the second can be obtained from the first by selecting a particular type profile    and setting  
                            
Therefore, to complete the proof it suffices to show that  
        
 
                  
so that     and        are functionally indistinguishable. To show this, it suffices to establish that 
replacing    in (45) with any other type profile    would not chance the distribution of       . 
By (25), a sufficient condition for this invariance is that, for all  ,    and    
            
                        
           
This condition holds since, by assumption,   has property    .  ∎ 
5.2  Implications  
By Proposition 11, an implication relation that does not hold for CSDs also does not hold for 
CEDs. Therefore, an immediate corollary of Propositions 7, 8, 9 and 10 is the following result. 
Proposition 16. For CEDs,              ,              ,             and            .  
The next three propositions identify implication relations that do not hold for CEDs even 
though they hold for CSDs. 
Proposition 17. For CEDs,            .  
Proof. This is proved by Example 2.  ∎ 
Proposition 18. For CEDs,            .  
Proof. This is proved by Example 3.  ∎ 
Proposition 19. For CEDs,                . 
Proof. This is proved by Example 6.  ∎ 
Propositions 12, 13, 14 and 15 identify six attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions 
that are defined by subsets of the properties of mechanisms defined in Section ‎ 2.2. These 
attributes plus  -implementability are shown in Figure 2 as attributes Ia, II, III, IVa, V, VIa and 
VII. The implication relations that are specified by the Hesse diagram among these attributes 
all hold trivially (since they follow immediately from relations between properties of 
mechanisms). By Proposition 16, additional implications among the seven attributes do not 
hold, and in particular, none of them is equivalent to any of the others. (The more detailed 
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argument given in Section ‎ 4.3 also applies here, mutatis mutandis.) Three more attributes 
are defined by    ,       and     (I, Ib and VI in Figure 2). The implication relations shown in 
Figure 2 among these attributes and between them and the other seven all hold trivially. It 
follows from Propositions 17 and 18, and from               in Proposition 16, that 
additional such implications do not hold. Two more attributes are defined by       and    . 
It follows from Proposition 19, and from             in Proposition 16, that the implication 
relations shown in Figure 2 between each of these attributes and each of the other ten are 
the only ones holding. This proves that there are precisely twelve distinct attributes of CEDs 
that can be defined by single subsets of the properties of mechanisms in Section ‎ 2.2.  
As indicated in Section ‎ 3.2.1, attributes I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII of CEDs are obtained from 
the similarly numbered attributes of CSDs by restriction. That is, a CED has any of these 
attributes if and only if it has the corresponding attribute as a CSD. This result is an 
immediate corollary of Theorem 1, which is stated in Section ‎ 3.2.1 and is proved below.  
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose first that              , and let   be a CED that is  -
implementable as a CSD. By Lemma 4, the canonical mechanism of   has all the properties in 
 . Therefore, by Corollary 1,   is  -implementable also as a CED. 
Next, consider the case        . As remarked in Section ‎ 4, for every  -implementable CSD 
  there is a mechanism     with property   that is functionally indistinguishable from the 
canonical mechanism. If   is moreover a CED, then by Corollary 1 the canonical strategy with 
the canonical mechanism is a correlated equilibrium, and the same is therefore true with the 
canonical mechanism replaced by    . Hence,   is  -implementable also as a CED.   
To complete the proof of the theorem it remains to note that, by Proposition 6 and 15, for 
both CSDs and CEDs,    -implementability and      -implementability are equivalent, and the 
same is true for    - and      -implementability.  ∎  
5.3  Conjunction of attributes 
The next step is to consider attributes of CEDs that are defined by pairs (or possibly triplets, 
etc.) of subsets of properties of mechanisms, that is, by conjunction of two (or more) of the 
twelve attributes identified above. Unlike for CSDs (see Lemma 5), genuinely new attributes 
can be defined this way. For example, it follows from the second part of the next proposition 
that the conjunction of  -implementability and  -implementability is a new attribute. 
Proposition 20. For CEDs,                                     but                    . 
Proof. To prove the first part of the proposition, it suffices to show that                      ; 
the equivalence then follows immediately from the trivial implications                    .  
Consider a CED   that is both    - and  -implementable. It has to be shown that   is also    -
implementable. By the assumption of  -implementability and (condition (i) in) Proposition 
4, there is a mapping                        such that                         for all 
type profiles  . By the assumption of    -implementability, there is a correlated strategy   
with a mechanism   satisfying     such that   is equal to the joint distribution of the random 50 
type profile   and the random action profile   defined by (7). In particular, for every 
                           , 
                                                         
             
       
     
Therefore,  
                                  
Let the mechanism     be as in the proof of Proposition 14. By (43) and (46), 
                                
Therefore, using the correlated strategy   with the mechanism     instead of   also gives 
the distribution  . Moreover, if     is used and a single player   changes his strategy from    
to some other strategy   
 , the player’s expected payoff changes to 
          
                        . By (43), this new payoff is equal to  
          
                       
which by (46) is  ’s expected payoff if he unilaterally changes his strategy from    to   
  when 
the correlated strategy   is used with the mechanism   (rather than    ). Since with this 
mechanism the correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium,  ’s change of strategy cannot 
increase his expected payoff. This proves that   is an equilibrium also with the mechanism 
   , which by construction satisfies   and  . 
The second part of the proposition is proved by Example 4.
21  ∎ 
It follows from the next proposition that the conjunction of  -implementability and  -
implementability is a new attribute. 
Proposition 21. For CEDs,                    . 
Proof. This is shown by Example 5.  ∎ 
Whether the conjunction of    -implementability and  -implementability is also a new 
attribute of CEDs is not known. It depends on the answer to the following question. 
Open Question. For CEDs, does                    ?  
This question corresponds to the question mark in Figure 2. The marked line in the Hesse 
diagram exists if and only if the answer is negative, which means that there is a CED in some 
Bayesian game that is both    - and  -implementable but not  -implementable. If the answer 
is affirmative, the two attributes of CEDs connected by the line (IVb and the unnumbered 
attribute) are actually one and the same, that is, they are equivalent attributes.  
                                                            
21 Parenthetically, an argument broadly similar to that used above shows that                     
would hold if it were assumed that the type distribution    has full support, i.e.,              (so 
that every type profile has positive probability). 
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Depending on the answer to the Open Question, there are two or three attributes of CEDs 
that can be defined as the conjunction of a pair of incomparable attributes of the twelve 
ones presented above. Thus, there are in total 14 or 15 attributes of CEDs, which are related 
to one another as in Figure 2. The following lemma shows that this list is complete in that 
there are no additional, nonequivalent attributes that can be defined as the conjunction of 
two or more of those in Figure 2. This result holds regardless of the answer to the Open 
Question.  
Lemma 6. The conjunction of any number of the attributes of CEDs in Figure 2 is equivalent 
to one of the attributes in the same figure.  
Proof of Lemma 6 (an outline). Proposition 15 proves the two special cases of the 
conjunctions of    -implementability and either  - or  -implementability. For the general 
case, it has to be shown that for every list                            , the conjunction 
            is equivalent to one of the attributes in Figure 2. (It suffices to consider lists 
with three or fewer entries, since in any longer list at least two elements represent 
comparable attributes.) This can be shown quite easily in a straightforward, case-by-case 
manner.  ∎  
6  Communication Equilibrium Distributions 
As for correlated strategy distributions and correlated equilibrium distributions, different 
kinds of mechanisms implement different kinds of communication equilibrium distributions. 
Specifically, for each subset   of the six properties of mechanisms described in Section ‎ 2.2, a 
MED is  -implementable if it is given by some communication equilibrium with a 
mechanism that has (all) the properties in  . This section, like the previous two, is mainly 
concerned with the implication relation between these attributes, and conjunctions of 
several attributes. Implication is denoted by the generic symbol   when it is clear from the 
context that it refers to attributes of MEDs. Otherwise, the more explicit symbol   
   
 is used. 
As it turns out, a necessary condition for the implication to hold is that a similar relation 
holds for CEDs. The proof of the following proposition is given at the end of this section.  
Proposition 22. For every two subsets                        , 
   
   
    implies     
   
   
Moreover, the same is true with   replaced by by            , for any list         of 
subsets of                  . 
Since by definition every MED is also a CED, it may seem that the reverse of the implication 
(47) also ought to hold. However, as remarked in Section ‎ 3.3, Example 7 shows that this is in 
fact not so, which is why the Hesse diagrams of the implications relations between attributes 
of CEDs (Figure 2) and between attributes of MEDs (Figure 3) are different. However, the 
differences only concern conjunction of attributes. As shown below, for attributes that a 
defined by single sets for properties of mechanisms, the implication relations for CEDs and 
MEDs are identical.  
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6.1  Equivalences 
The following propositions parallel those in Section ‎ 5.1. Thus, they identify instances in 
which the reverse of (47) also holds.  
Proposition 23. For MEDs,                            . 
Proof. It has to be shown that for every communication equilibrium   with a mechanism   
that has property    , the resulting MED   is      -implementable.  
Unlike in the proof of Proposition 12, the mechanism   is not necessarily canonical. 
Nevertheless, without loss of generality, it may be assumed that it satisfies (6). Otherwise, 
  could be replaced by any mechanism     satisfying (6) such that 
        
 
             
These equalities imply that     also has property    , and it is not difficult to see that   with     
is also a communication equilibrium, since for any profile of reported types, the messages 
that     sends are indistinguishable from those of  . 
Consider the correlated strategy     and the mechanism                        , which are defined, 
respectively, by (26) and the following generalization of (36): 
                   
       
             
       
                         
Arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 5 show that        has properties   
and    . It has to be shown that, with this mechanism,     is a communication equilibrium. That 
is, for every player  , type   
  for that player and function     
         
       , 
                              
where   is the random action profile corresponding to     and    is obtained from (13) by 
replacing   
 ,     and   by     
 ,       and       , respectively. Obviously, it suffices to consider the 
(effectively, completely general) case       and   
      
 , for which  
                                                 
and 
  
        
               
              
           
       
             
       
             
  
                       
                      
                
If (48) does not hold (for      ), then there are some   
  and   
    
    such that  
                  
       
           
       
           
                        
    
It follows from properties     and (6) of   that the pair of random variables   and     
       
is independent of      
            




          
          
                   
                    
                 
  
                   
    
where   
               is the function defined by 
  
               
           
           
    
        
    
        
However, in conjunction with (49), inequality (50) contradicts the assumption that   with 
the mechanism   is a communication equilibrium, since it shows that when player 1’s type 
is   
 , he can gain from misreporting it as   
  and switching from    to   
 . The contradiction 
proves that the correlated strategy     with the mechanism        is a communication 
equilibrium.  ∎   
Proposition 24. For MEDs,              . 
Proof. Identical to the proof of Proposition 13.  ∎ 
Proposition 25. For MEDs,                 and                . 
Proof. Identical to the proof of Proposition 14.  ∎ 
Proposition 26. For MEDs,                                                                  
              and                                                                  
             . 
Proof. It suffices to show that                        , and similarly with   replaced by  . By 
Proposition 15, both implications hold of CEDs, and the result that they also hold for MEDs 
follows immediately from the fact that a      -implementable CED is automatically a MED. 
                      ∎ 
6.2  Implications  
Implication (47) in Proposition 22 can equivalently be expressed by its counterpositive: If a 
counterexample of a  -implementable CED that is not  -implementable exists, then a 
similar counterexample can be found for MEDs. Finding the latter can be easy or quite 
complicated. The former holds if the CED example employs a correlated equilibrium (with a 
mechanism with the properties in  ) that is also a communication equilibrium: players have 
no incentive to lie about their types. In this case, the same example can be used for MEDs, 
since a CED that is not  -implementable a fortiori does not have that attribute as a MED. 
The proofs of the following two propositions use this simple observation. 
Proposition 27. For MEDs,            ,                           and              .  
Proof. Proposition 16, which establishes the same for CEDs, relies on Proposition 11. 
Therefore, it suffices to show that a result similar to the latter holds with correlated 
equilibrium (distribution) replaced with communication equilibrium (distribution). This can 
be shown by simply making this replacement throughout the proof of Proposition 11.  ∎  
Proposition 28. For MEDs,            .  
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Proof. The correlated equilibrium with the mechanism with property   that is described in 
Example 2 is in fact a communication equilibrium. If player 2 lies about his type, player 1 will 
get as a message an incorrect type profile and will consequentially choose an action for 
which a positive payoff for 2 is impossible. For a similar reason, player 1 cannot gain from 
lying; in this case, the lie will only affect type    of player 2. The MED of this communication 
equilibrium in not    -implementable since, as shown, it does not have this attribute even as a 
CED.  ∎ 
Even if the correlated equilibrium that proves that a certain implication does not hold for 
CEDs is not a communication equilibrium, it may be possible to make truthful type reports 
incentive compatible by augmenting the original game with a suitable auxiliary game and 
modifying the mechanism and correlated strategy accordingly.  
Suppose, for example, that each of the two players in a Bayesian game can have type    or 
  , and all four type profiles are equally probable. The game can then be modified by 
adding to it an auxiliary game that requires each player to push one of three buttons,   ,    
or   . Depending on both players’ choices of button and on their types, a very large number 
      is then either added to or subtracted from their payoffs in the original game. 
Specifically, the change in payoffs (   or   ) is determined according to the following 
table, where the rows and columns correspond to the choices of player 1 and 2, respectively, 
and          is the product of their types:  




         
         
         
   
Thus, both for        and for   , three cells in the table represent reward and six 
represent punishment. Any mechanism in the original game can be turned into one in the 
augmented game by appending to the message it sends to each player, which pertains to the 
original game, a recommendation of button in the auxiliary game. The latter is determined in 
the following way. The mechanism attempts to identify the “rewarding” cells by calculating 
the product of the players’ reported types, it randomly selects one of these cells (each with 
probability    ), and it recommends its row and column to player 1 and 2, respectively. As 
detailed below, the feature of the mechanism that encourages truth telling is that 
misreporting will result in misidentification of the rewarding cells. Note that, for any pair of 
(reported) types, the recommendation to each player is equally likely to be   ,    or   . 
Therefore, the modified mechanism has property     or     if the original mechanism has the 
same property. It cannot, however, have any of the other four properties of mechanisms. 
(With a somewhat more sophisticated auxiliary game, it is possible to also retain property  .)  
To any correlated equilibrium in the original game there corresponds a communication 
equilibrium in the augmented game. In that equilibrium, the mechanism appends 
recommendations as described above, each player pushes the recommended button, and 
plays in the original game according to the original correlated equilibrium. To see that 
truthful type reports are incentive compatible, suppose that, for example, button    is 
recommended to type    of player 1. If both players reported their types truthfully and they 55 
follow the recommendations of the mechanism, the player can infer that player 2 will 
choose    or    if his type is    or   , respectively, and in both cases, the players will get 
the reward  . However, if (only) player 1 misreported his type, then player  ’s type has the 
opposite relation with his action. Player 1 must then choose    or    if  ’s type is    or   , 
respectively; otherwise,   will be subtracted from rather than added to his payoff. Since the 
players’ types are independent, this means that he cannot get more than zero in 
expectation. Thus, dishonesty does not pay. 
Proposition 29. For MEDs,            .  
Proof. Consider the Bayesian game and the    - but not  -implementable CED presented in 
Example 3. This CED is not a MED. However, a communication equilibrium with a mechanism 
that has property     can be obtained by modifying the game and the correlated equilibrium 
described in the example by adding an auxiliary game as above. The corresponding MED is 
not  -implementable even as CED. It is not difficult to see that, if it were  -implementable, 
the same would be true for the original CED.  ∎ 
The proofs of the next two propositions involve more particular modifications of the original 
counterexamples (that is, those refereeing to CEDs). 
Proposition 30. For MEDs,                . 
Proof. Consider the following changes to the game and CED in Example 6. Both players can 
have type    or   , and all four type profiles are equally probable. If the players’ types 
differ or are identical, they both receive the payoff specified by the matrix  
       
 
 
    
     
         
       
 
 
    
   
     
respectively. With the mechanism described in Example 6, the correlated strategy of 
following the mechanism’s recommendations is still a correlated equilibrium. For a player of 
any type who receives the message   and takes that action, the expected payoff is 
                       , whereas playing   instead would only yield                        
         . If the message is  , taking that action gives       while playing   would give  . 
This correlated equilibrium is moreover a communication equilibrium. If a player misreports 
his type, he will maximize his payoff by taking the recommended action, since this is also the 
action that the other player will take if the (real) types differ (and if the types are identical, 
then the expected payoff from any action is    ). Thus, a dishonest player cannot get more 
than                                    , which is less than the                          
       a truthful report would yield.  
It remains to show that the corresponding MED is different from that given by any 
communication (or even correlated) equilibrium   with a mechanism that has properties   
and  . The messages that such a mechanism sends to the players can be written as      , 
for arbitrary type profile   . Since the players’ actions are identical if their types are identical, 
necessarily 56 
                                                             
If        is such that the left- (and, hence, also the right-) hand side equals       or 
     , respectively, then type    or    of player 1 will get         from taking the action   
he is supposed to take but           from playing  . Therefore, with probability   all four 
actions in (51) must be identical, which shows that the above MED, in which the players’ 
actions may differ, cannot be obtained. ∎ 
Proposition 31. For MEDs,                     and                      . 
Proof. The first part is proved by Example 7. To prove the second part, consider the following 
changes to the game and CED in Example 4. Player 2 has the constant payoff  , and he is 
allowed to choose action   as well as  . Choosing   rather than   reduces by   the payoff of 
type   
  of player 1, and has no effect on the other payoffs. The two mechanisms considered 
in Example 4 and the corresponding correlated equilibria are modified as follows. Both 
mechanisms instruct player 2 to play   if player 1 reports the type   
  and to play   
otherwise, and player 2 obeys. Clearly, this means that type   
  of player 1 has an incentive 
to report his type truthfully. The same is true for type   
 , for whom the CED gives the highest 
possible payoff. ∎ 
An alternative proof for the last proposition could be obtained by using the following simple 
and generally applicable modification of the game and correlated equilibria in the original 
example. Instead of changing the players’ action spaces, a new player is added to the game. 
This “player  ” has a single type, and his action space is the collection   of type profiles of 
the original players. If the action he chooses coincides with the original players’ actual type 
profile, everyone gets a huge bonus. Any correlated equilibrium in the original game can be 
modified as follows. The mechanism sends to player 0 the type reports of the other players, 
and he chooses the corresponding action. This obviously creates an incentive for the players 
to report their types truthfully, and thus turns the correlated equilibrium into a 
communication equilibrium (in the modified game). If property  ,    ,   or   holds for the 
original mechanism, the modified one also has the same property. 
The following proposition uses this construction to show that if the answer to the Open 
Question presented in Section ‎ 5.3 is negative, then the same is true for MEDs. Note that if 
the answer will turn out to be affirmative, the proposition is uninformative, since its 
assertion holds vacuously.  
Proposition 32. If, for MEDs,                    , then the same is true for CEDs 
Proof. Suppose there is a CED   in some Bayesian game which is not  -implementable but it 
is given by some correlated equilibrium   with a mechanism   that has property     as well 
as by a correlated equilibrium    with a mechanism    that has property  . It has to be 
shown that a MED with similar properties also exists. 
Modify the game and the two correlated equilibria that give   by adding a new player, as 
detailed above, thus turning   and    into communication equilibria, whose MEDs are 
identical. The MED assigns nonzero probability only to pairs of type and action profiles in 
which the former coincides with the action of player  , and the probability in this case is 
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equal to that assigned by   to the pair obtained by omitting player  ’s action. Any 
communication, or even just correlated, equilibrium that gives this MED can be turned into a 
correlated equilibrium in the original game (in which   is a CED) simply by omitting the 
message to player   and the corresponding coordinate of the correlated strategy. If the 
mechanism had property  , the omission would not affect it. It therefore follows from the 
assumption concerning the CED   that a mechanism implementing the MED cannot in fact 
have property  .  ∎ 
Propositions 23, 24, 25 and 26 identify six attributes of communication equilibrium 
distributions that are defined by subsets of the properties of mechanisms described in 
Section ‎ 2.2. Figure 3 shows these attributes, marked II, III, IVa, V, VIa and VII, and eleven 
additional ones. The implication relations that are specified by the Hesse diagram among 
these 17 attributes all hold trivially, since they follow immediately from relations between 
properties of mechanisms. For two of the implications, it is not known whether the inverse 
implication also holds. The uncertainty is indicated in Figure 3 by a question mark. If the 
inverse implication does hold, then the marked line should be removed and the two 
connected boxes should be coalesced, as they represent equivalent attributes. The following 
arguments show that none of the other attributes in Figure 3 are equivalent, and more 
generally, that the Hesse diagram shows all the implication relations between attributes of 
MEDs. 
If attributes that involve conjunctions were removed from Figure 2 and Figure 3, the two 
Hesse diagrams would become identical. In Section ‎ 5 it is shown that, among the remaining 
twelve attributes of CEDs, the implications shown in the diagram are the only ones holding. 
Essentially the same arguments prove the same for MEDs, with Propositions 27, 28, 29 and 
30 replacing 16, 17, 18 and 19, respectively. For each of the attributes in Figure 3 that does 
involve conjunction, it follows from Proposition 31 that the only other attributes that imply 
or are implied by it are those indicated as such by the Hesse diagram. This proves that the 
diagram is complete in terms of implication relations. The following lemma shows that it is 
also complete in terms of closedness under conjunctions.  
Lemma 7. The conjunction of any number of the attributes of MEDs in Figure 3 is equivalent 
to one of the attributes in the same figure.  
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 6, except that is uses Proposition 26 
instead of 15.  ∎ 
It is now possible to show that the implication relation   
   
 between attributes of MEDs is 
indeed stronger, in a sense, than the corresponding relation for CEDs. 
Proof of Proposition 22. It suffices to consider   and   that belong to the group of 27 
subsets shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 (see Section ‎ 1). As indicated, if attributes that involve 
conjunctions are removed from these diagrams, they become identical. This proves the 
implication (47) as well as the reverse one. 
For the more general version in which   is replaced by        , it suffices to consider the 
case in which   - and   -implementability (of CEDs, or equivalently MEDs) are 58 
incomparable; the case in which they are comparable reduces to the version just analyzed. 
Consider the meet (greatest lower bound) of   - and   -implementability in Figure 3, and 
their meet in Figure 2. The two are not necessarily similar in any sense. The former is an 
attribute of MEDs and the latter an attribute of CEDs. However, an exhaustive 
straightforward examination shows that, with a single exception, for all                      , 
if the first attribute implies  -implementability in Figure 3, then the second one does so in 
Figure 2 (but not necessarily conversely). The single exception is the case covered by 
Proposition 32:    and    are       and    , and        . This proves the version of (47) in 
which   is replaced by        . 
For the version in which the list         has three or more elements, it again suffices to 
consider the case in which no two elements describe comparable attributes. It is, however, 
not difficult to check that this means that, in both diagrams,             is (equivalent to) 
attribute VII. Therefore, the version of (47) in which   is replaced by             holds 
trivially. ∎ 
7  Correlated Strategy, Correlated Equilibrium and 
Communication Equilibrium Payoffs 
The expected payoffs of the players in a Bayesian game are completely determined by the 
joint distribution of the players’ types and actions. However, the relation between 
distributions and payoff vectors is normally many-to-one. Therefore, if a particular 
correlated equilibrium distribution cannot be implemented by a mechanism of a particular 
kind, it does not necessarily follow that the corresponding payoff vector is not 
implementable; it may be that a mechanism of that kind implements another CED with the 
same payoffs. Games with constant payoff functions provide a trivial example of this. In such 
games, a CED is implementable if and only if it is implementable as a CSD, so that the 
connection between implementability of distributions and the properties of the mechanism 
is as detailed in Section ‎ 4. By contrast, the single possible payoff vector is of course 
implementable by any mechanism.  
Correlated strategy payoffs (CSPs), correlated equilibrium payoffs (CEPs) and communication 
equilibrium payoffs (MEPs) in Bayesian games can be classified in a manner similar to the 
classification of CSDs (Figure 1), CEDs (Figure 2) and MEDs (Figure 3). Each subset   of the 
properties of mechanisms described in Section ‎ 2.2 defines an attribute of CSPs, CEPs and 
MEPs, namely,  -implementability. A payoff vector                       in a specified 
 -player Bayesian game is  -implementable if it is obtained in some correlated strategy, 
correlated equilibrium or communication equilibrium in the game with a mechanism that 
has (all) the properties in   (equivalently, if it is obtained in some CSD, CED or MED, 
respectively, that is implementable by such a mechanism). For two subset      
                 ,  -implementability of CSPs implies  -implementability if in every Bayesian 
game every CSP that is implementable by some mechanism with the properties in   is also 
implementable by a mechanism with the properties in  . This relation is written as    
   
 . 
For CEPs and MEPs, the relations    
   
  and    
   
  are defined in a similar way.  59 
The main result concerning implementability of payoff vectors is Theorem 4 (Section ‎ 3.5). 
According to this theorem, which is proved below, both aspects of the equilibrium 
outcomes, the joint distributions of types and actions and the resulting payoffs, are affected 
by the properties of the implementing mechanisms in a similar way. More precisely, there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between attributes of CSDs and attributes of CSPs, which are 
both described by the Hesse diagram in Figure 1, and similar correspondences exists 
between attributes of CEDs and CEPs (Figure 2), and between attributes of MEDs and MEPs 
(Figure 3). Note that the example of a game with constant payoffs does not contradict these 
findings. The properties of the implementing mechanism need only limit the equilibrium 
payoffs in some Bayesian game. They do not have to (and they cannot) come into play in 
every game.  
Proof of Theorem 4. The proofs for correlated equilibria and for communication equilibria 
are nearly identical. Only the former is presented below; the latter can be obtained from it 
essentially by replacing ‘correlated’ with ‘communication’ throughout. The proof for 
correlated strategies can also be easily obtained from the proof below by simplifying it in the 
obvious manner.  
It has to be shown that, for every                        , 
   
   
   if and only if     
   
   
and that the same is true with   replaced by            , for any list         of subsets of 
                 . One direction of (52) (“if”) is easy.    
   
  and    
   
  cannot both hold, 
since the former means that, in some Bayesian game, there is a  -implementable CED   
with a payoff vector that is different from that of every  -implementable CED in the same 
game, whereas the latter implies that   itself is  -implementable. 
To prove the nontrivial direction of (52) (“only if”), define the extension of a Bayesian game 
as the game obtained by the addition of dummy players — one for each element of      . A 
dummy player has only one possible type and one action, which are therefore insignificant in 
that they cannot affect the payoff of any player. In the following, the types and actions of 
the dummy players are ignored, and the collections of type profiles and action profiles in the 
extended game are thus identified with those in the original game (namely,   and  , 
respectively). The significance of the dummy players lies in their payoff functions. The payoff 
function                of the dummy player representing the types-actions pair 
              is defined as the indicator function         , which returns   if the argument is 
equal to       and   otherwise. Thus, the dummy players’ payoffs indicate the types and 
actions of the original, real players. In particular, for every correlated equilibrium 
distribution   and every element       of      , the expected payoff of the corresponding 
dummy player is equal to           . It follows that two CEDs in the extended game,   and 
   , give the same CEP if and only if they are equal,        .  
Every mechanism in the original game can be extended in a natural way to a mechanism in 
the extended game by sending arbitrary constant messages to the dummy players. The 
original and extended mechanisms have the exact same properties in                  , and in 
(52) 60 
the following they are identified. Using this identification, every correlated strategy in the 
original game can be extended in a natural way to a correlated strategy with the same 
mechanism in the extended game by assigning to each of the dummy players his single 
possible strategy. Observe that:   
1.  the original correlated strategy has the same distribution as the extended one (recall the 
above comment regarding the identification of profiles in the original and the extended 
games), and  
2.  one of them is a correlated equilibrium if and only if this is so for the other.  
Moreover, every CED in the extended game can be obtained in the above manner from 
some CED in the original game. The former may be the distribution of a correlated strategy 
with a mechanism that sends variable messages to some dummy players. However, these 
messages are inconsequential (since a dummy player has only one possible action) and 
hence can be replaced by constant ones. Such replacement preserves each of the properties 
 ,    ,  ,    ,   and  . 
Suppose now that    
   
 . Then, for every  -implementable CED   in the extended game 
there is a  -implementable CED     in the same game with the same payoff vector. As 
indicated, necessarily         , so that   is also  -implementable. It follows, by Observations 1 
and 2 above, that every  -implementable CED in the original game is also  -implementable. 
This proves that    
   
 . 
Inspection of the above proof of (52) reveals that it applies virtually unchanged also to the 
more general version in which   is replaced by            .  ∎ 
 
Figure 4. Hesse diagram of the implication relations between attributes of (equilibrium) outcomes in Bayesian 
games: correlated strategy payoffs (CSPs), correlated strategy distributions (CSDs), correlated equilibrium 
payoffs (CEPs), correlated equilibrium distributions (CEDs), communication equilibrium payoffs (MEPs) and 
communication equilibrium distributions (MEDs). A box represents a pair of equivalent implication relations: 
for all subsets           and   of (the set of properties of mechanisms)                  , one implication 
holds is and only if the other holds. A line represents only one-way implication (between implications): 
whenever an implication relation in the lower box holds, so does each implication relation in the higher box. 
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8  Summary 
The three Hesse diagrams in Section ‎ 3 refer to different notions of outcomes or solution 
concepts. Specifically, they present the implication relation between attributes of correlated 
strategy distributions or payoffs (Figure 1), between attributes of correlated equilibrium 
distributions or payoffs (Figure 2), and between attributes of communication equilibrium 
distributions or payoffs (Figure 3). However, since in all six cases the attributes are defined in 
terms of properties of the implementing mechanisms, the implication relations themselves 
are potentially comparable. Indeed, the results in the previous sections (Propositions 11 and 
22 and Theorem 4) show that each of these relations implies or is implied (or both) by each 
of the others. This implication relation between implication relations is shown by the Hesse 
diagram in Figure 4.  
The Hesse diagrams in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 together imply that the 
number of classes of CSDs (and CEPs) is strictly smaller than the number for CEDs (and CEPs), 
and the latter is strictly smaller than the number of classes of MEDs (and MEPs). Only the 
first of these numbers is precisely known: seven. The second number is either 14 or 15 
(depending on the answer to the Open Problem presented in Section ‎ 5.3) and the third 
number (which, as indicated, is strictly greater that the second) is 15, 16 or 17. 
Correlated and communication equilibria can both be viewed as special cases of a model in 
which the messages that the mechanism sends to the players may depend on both their true 
and reported types. The dependence on the latter may be of little significance if there are no 
limitations on the mechanism’s use of the former. However, the present setup is 
constructed specifically for facilitating analyzing such limitations and their significance. Thus, 
suppose for example that only certain aggregate data regarding the players’ true types are 
available to the mechanism, e.g., a “checksum” of the types. Then, unilateral deviations from 
truthful type reporting may be detectable even if the profile of reported type in not itself 
impossible, but not so for the identity of the player who lied about his type. The meaning of 
a correlated strategy in this general setting is the same as in the two special ones: it 
translates the mechanism’s messages into type-dependant actions for the players. A natural 
requirement, which generalizes both correlated and communication equilibrium, is that it is 
incentive compatible for players to truthfully report their types and take the actions that are 
indicated by the messages they receive. The question arises, how different limitations on the 
mechanism affect the outcomes of such “correlated–communication” equilibria. From this 
perspective, the results reported in this paper only concern two special kinds of limitations. 
In the first, the reported types cannot affect the messages that the mechanism sends to the 
players, and in the second, the true types cannot affect the messages.  
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